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SCHOOLHOUSE ROCKED: HOSTY V. CARTER AND 
THE CASE AGAINST HAZELWOOD 
 
Virginia J. Nimick* 
 
I do not believe that it can be too often repeated that the 
freedoms of speech, press, petition and assembly 
guaranteed by the First Amendment must be accorded to 
the ideas we hate or sooner or later they will be denied to 
the ideas we cherish.1 
INTRODUCTION 
The federal courts have long held that public schools serve as 
“the cradle of our democracy,”2 and have recognized the special 
status of public schools resulting from the particular educational 
mission with which they are entrusted.3 Unlike any other 
                                                          
 * Brooklyn Law School Class of 2007; B.A., Davidson College, 2004.  The 
author would like to thank her family for their overwhelming love and support. 
The author would also like to thank the Journal of Law and Policy staff, 
especially Jason Putter for his humor and patience. The author wishes to thank 
Margaret Hosty, the titular plaintiff, for her enthusiasm and guidance.  And 
finally, the author would like to thank her friends, especially John Miras, John 
Mattoon, Christopher Prior, and David Kaye, who have made it all worthwhile. 
1 Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 137 
(1961) (Black, J., dissenting). 
2 James v. Bd. of Educ., 461 F.2d 566, 568 (2d Cir. 1972). 
3 Brown v. Bd of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
[E]ducation is perhaps the most important function of state and local 
governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great 
expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the 
importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the 
performance of our most basic responsibilities, even service in the 
armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is 
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governmental body, our public schools are charged with two 
potentially incompatible tasks: encouraging independent thought 
and cultivating the “marketplace of ideas”4 while, at the same time, 
instilling the values necessary to create productive members of 
society.5 With this in mind, public colleges and universities across 
the country have, for the most part, broadly embraced the First 
Amendment.6 There are times, however, when the free expression 
rights embodied in the First Amendment clash with administrative 
attempts to limit student speech. One such conflict arose in the fall 
of 2000 at Governors State University when school administrators 
required student journalists to obtain official approval before 
publishing the school’s student-run paper.7 
In the resulting lawsuit, Hosty v. Carter, student journalists 
alleged that such prior review and restraint violated their First 
Amendment rights of free speech and expression.8 Ultimately, the 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the interests of 
the college trumped the rights of the students,9 resulting in alarm 
                                                          
the principle incident in awakening the child to cultural values, in 
preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to 
adjust normally to his environment. 
Id. 
4 This “marketplace of ideas” concept can be traced in federal 
jurisprudence to Justice Holmes’ dissenting opinion in Abrams v. United States, 
250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[T]he ultimate good desired 
is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of 
the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth 
is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.”). 
5 Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 
864-65 (1982). For a more detailed discussion of this potential conflict, see, e.g., 
William G. Buss, School Newspapers, Public Forum and The First Amendment, 
74 IOWA L. REV. 505, 505 (1989). 
6 The First Amendment provides, “Congress shall make no law respecting 
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people to 
peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
7 Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731, 732 (7th Cir. 2005) (en banc), cert. denied, 
164 L. Ed. 2d 47 (2006). 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
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and outrage among free speech advocates across the country.10 
Prior to the decision in Hosty, the standard derived from the 
seminal First Amendment case of Hazelwood School District v. 
Kuhlmeier11 had been applied only to student speech in primary 
and secondary schools. Hosty represents the first extension of the 
restrictive Hazelwood framework to post-secondary student 
speech, and stands in direct conflict with decisions from both the 
First and Sixth Circuits. 12 
According to the Hazelwood standard, school officials may 
regulate “school-sponsored expressive activities” (such as a 
student newspaper) as long as their actions are “reasonably related 
to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”13 Not only does Hazelwood’s 
application in Hosty place the Seventh Circuit in direct conflict 
with its sister Circuits, it represents a break from the deeply 
entrenched tradition of recognizing college and university 
campuses as a marketplace of ideas. 
Though it did not endorse the idea, the Supreme Court did not 
foreclose the possibility of extending the Hazelwood framework to 
college campuses. Instead, in what has become an increasingly 
problematic footnote, the Court declined to address Hazelwood’s 
relevance outside of primary and secondary education.14 Given the 
                                                          
10 See, e.g., Student Press Law Center, News Flash: Free Speech Groups 
Worry Hosty Ruling Will Scale Back Students’ First Amendment Rights, 
available at http://www.splc.org/newsflash.asp?id=1042 (quoting Greg 
Lukianoff, director of public and legal advocacy for the Foundation for 
Individual Rights in Education (FIRE), explaining, “[a]s much as people like to 
think they value free speech, as soon as there’s a loophole that people can take 
advantage of to silence their critics or opinions they think are wrong, they will 
jump on them. This opinion creates tremendous opportunities for administrators 
and other students who want to infantilize students or deny them their basic 
rights.”). 
11 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
12 Student Gov’t Ass’n v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Mass., 868 F.2d 
473, 480 n.6 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding that Hazelwood “is not applicable to 
college newspapers.”); Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342, 346 (6th Cir. 2001) (en 
banc) (finding that Hazelwood “has little application to this case.”). 
13 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273. 
14 Id. at 273 n.7 (“We need not now decide whether the same degree of 
deference is appropriate with respect to school-sponsored expressive activities at 
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impact an extension of the reasoning in Hosty could have on First 
Amendment free speech rights, Hazelwood framework should not, 
as a matter of law and policy, be applied to higher education. 
Parts I.A and B of this Note discuss the development of free 
speech rights of students in primary and secondary public 
schools.15 Part I.C focuses on the development of student speech in 
post-secondary public institutions. Part II concerns the Seventh 
Circuit’s decision in Hosty, representing the first unequivocal 
application of Hazelwood to the student press outside of the high 
school setting. Part III questions the applicability of an extension 
of Hazelwood to post-secondary education. In addition, Part III 
sets forth several arguments, grounded in both law and policy, 
questioning the ruling in Hosty and discussing the practical effect 
of the decision on future student speech. 
I. FREE SPEECH RIGHTS OF STUDENTS IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
The Supreme Court has had occasion to address the rights of 
students in public institutions on numerous occasions.16 Parts A 
and B of this section address students’ First Amendment rights in 
public primary and secondary schools, while Part C explores the 
rights of students enrolled in undergraduate or graduate 
institutions. 
A. Student Speech in Primary and Secondary Schools 
The free speech rights of students in primary and secondary 
schools have been shaped by three cases: Tinker v. Des Moines 
                                                          
the college and university level.”). 
15 For purposes of this discussion, “post-secondary” is used to refer to those 
students who have graduated from high school, and includes those students 
enrolled at both undergraduate and graduate institutions. 
16 The First Amendment applies with particular force to public institutions, 
as they are acting as an arm of the state. Accordingly, this Note deals only with 
students enrolled in the public education system. A discussion of the free speech 
rights of students in private institutions is beyond the scope of this Note. For an 
excellent starting point for such a discussion, see, e.g., Nancy J. Meyer, 
Assuring Freedom for the College Student Press After Hazelwood, 24 VAL. U. 
L. REV. 53 (1989). 
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Independent School District,17 Bethel School District v. Fraser,18 
and Hazelwood. Tinker’s now infamous declaration, “[i]t can 
hardly be said that students or teachers shed their constitutional 
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse 
gate,”19 stands as a strong affirmation of students’ rights. However, 
in the years since Tinker, the Supreme Court has severely 
circumscribed those rights with its decisions in Fraser and 
Hazelwood.20 
1. Tinker v. Des Moines: Material and Substantial Disruption 
Tinker involved three young teenagers: John Tinker, 
Christopher Eckhardt, and John’s younger sister, Mary Beth 
Tinker. In December 1965, a group of adults and students met at 
the Eckhardt home and resolved to publicize their objections to the 
Vietnam War by wearing black armbands during the holiday 
season.21 The students did so despite a school district-wide ban.22 
For this expression, Eckhardt and Mary Beth Tinker were 
suspended; John Tinker was sent home without a formal 
suspension.23 Through their parents, the students sued the school 
district alleging that their First Amendment rights of free speech 
and expression had been violated.24 
In a 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court sided with the students.25 
Justice Fortas, writing for the majority, began by noting that school 
                                                          
17 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
18 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
19 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506. 
20 See discussion infra Parts I.A.2-3. 
21 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504. 
22 Id. (The principals of the Des Moines schools became aware of this plan 
and adopted a policy stating that any student wearing an armband to school 
would be asked to remove it and, if he refused, would be suspended until he 
agreed to return without it). 
23 JOHN W. JOHNSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR STUDENT RIGHTS: TINKER V. 
DES MOINES AND THE 1960S 18, 20, 25 (1997). 
24 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504. 
25 Id. at 513-14. 
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boards, as agents of the State, were not above the Bill of Rights.26 
Quoting Justice Jackson, he wrote: “[t]hat [Boards of Education] 
are educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous 
protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are 
not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to 
discount important principles of our government as mere 
platitudes.”27 The Court reasoned that in order for school officials 
to justify a prohibition against a particular type of expression, they 
must demonstrate that their actions were fueled by something more 
than the “desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that 
always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.”28 Thus, restriction of 
expressive activity is appropriate only when it can be shown that 
the conduct in question would “materially and substantially 
interfere” with the operation of the school.29 
Applying that standard to the facts of Tinker, the Court 
concluded that the armbands had not “materially and substantially 
interfer[ed]” with the school’s educational mission.30 Only a few of 
the nearly 20,000 students in the school system wore the armbands 
and only five were suspended for it.31 Noting the importance of 
respecting constitutionally protected rights in the nation’s public 
schools, Justice Fortas concluded “state-operated schools may not 
                                                          
26 Id. at 508. 
27 Id. (quoting West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 
637 (1943)). 
28 Id. at 509. 
29 Id. The dissent reached the opposite conclusion: 
The original idea of schools, which I do not believe is yet 
abandoned as worthless or not of date, was that children had not 
yet reached the point of experience and wisdom which enabled 
them to teach all of their elders. It may be that the Nation has 
outworn the old-fashioned slogan that ‘children are to been seen 
not heard,’ but one may, I hope, be permitted to harbor the thought 
that taxpayers send children to school on the premise that at their 
age they need to learn, not teach. 
Id. at 522 (Black, J. dissenting). 
30 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513-14. 
31 Id. at 514. See also JOHNSON, supra note 23, at 166 (discussing court 
notes in which the clerk observed in the record a total lack of violent incidents 
related to the armbands). 
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be enclaves of totalitarianism. School officials do not possess 
absolute authority over their students. Students in school as well as 
out of school are ‘persons’ under the Constitution.”32 
Though Tinker involved student speech apart from journalism, 
less than three months later, its reasoning was expanded to prohibit 
censorship of the student press.33 A federal court in New York 
applied Tinker to a high school newspaper, holding that “[i]t is 
patently unfair in light of the free speech doctrine to close to the 
students the forum which they deem effective to present their 
ideas. The rationale of Tinker carries beyond the facts in that 
case.”34 
2. Bethel School District v. Fraser: The Beginning of the Retreat 
The lower courts spent the next twenty years fleshing out the 
“material and substantial disruption” test.35 In 1985, the Supreme 
                                                          
32 Id. at 511. Justice Fortas continued: 
In our system, students may not be regarded as closed-circuit 
recipients of only that which the States chooses to communicate. 
They may not be confined to the expression of those sentiments 
what are officially approved. In the absence of a specific showing 
of constitutionally valid reasons to regulate their speech, students 
are entitled to freedom of expression of their views. 
Id. 
33 Interestingly, Tinker grew out of an instance of censorship of a student 
newspaper. Three days before the students wore their armbands and before the 
school district banned them, a school administrator censored an article in 
Eckhardt’s school newspaper. Another student, Ross Peterson, had submitted the 
article to the paper explaining the purpose of the planned protest and calling for 
support of a truce. After prohibiting publication of the article, school 
administrators “hastily” met and banned armbands from the schools. See, 
JOHNSON, supra note 23 at 5-6; Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504. 
34 Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (emphasis 
added) (internal citations omitted). 
35 The lower federal courts followed Tinker in some instances, while in 
others, they strayed. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Students Do Leave Their 
First Amendment Rights at the Schoolhouse Gates: What’s Left of Tinker?, 48 
DRAKE L. REV. 527 (2000). As Professor Chemerinsky explains, “There are 
literally dozens of lower federal court cases over the last thirty years dealing 
with student speech. They follow no consistent pattern; some are quite speech-
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Court’s decision in New Jersey v. T.L.O., limited the Fourth 
Amendment rights of minors in public schools and signaled a shift 
toward conservatism in the Court.36 Just one year later, in Bethel 
School District No. 403 v. Fraser,37 the Supreme Court broadened 
its changing philosophy to encompass students’ First Amendment 
rights as well. The dispute began when Matthew Fraser delivered a 
sexually suggestive speech in support of a student government 
candidate at a school assembly.38 After delivering the speech, 
Fraser faced suspension for violating a school policy prohibiting 
the use of profane language.39 He ultimately served a two-day 
suspension and filed suit claiming a violation of his First 
Amendment free speech rights.40 
In a 7-2 decision, the Court upheld the suspension and 
recognized the first exception to Tinker, holding that schools may 
determine what constitutes appropriate speech in classrooms and 
school assemblies.41 Chief Justice Burger, though acknowledging 
Tinker’s proclamation that “students do not ‘shed their 
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the 
schoolhouse gate,’”42 declared that “the constitutional rights of 
students in public school are not automatically coextensive with 
the rights of adults in other settings.”43 While noting the 
importance of permitting the expression of a variety of 
                                                          
protective and follow Tinker’s philosophy as well as its holding, while others are 
very restrictive of student speech and treat Tinker as if it has been overruled.” Id. 
at 542. 
36 469 U.S. 325, 327 (1985) (balancing school officials’ need to search and 
students’ Fourth Amendment rights); see also, JOHNSON, supra note 23, at 206-
07. 
37 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
38 Id. at 677-78. 
39 The Bethel High School disciplinary rule provided that “[c]onduct which 
materially and substantially interferes with the educational process is prohibited, 
including the use of obscene, profane language or gestures.” Id. at 678. 
40 Id. at 679. 
41 Id. at 683. 
42 Id. at 680 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506). 
43 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683 (referring to New Jersey v. T.L.O., 460 U.S. 325, 
340-42 (1985)). 
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viewpoints,44 the Court deferred to the administration’s 
determination that Fraser’s speech had seriously undermined the 
school’s educational mission.45 Reasoning that the school’s 
primary function was to “inculcate the habits and manners of 
civility,”46 the Court concluded that the school was not required to 
tolerate “lewd, indecent, or offensive speech and conduct such as 
that indulged by [Fraser].”47 
The Court further highlighted the differences between Tinker 
and Fraser. First, unlike the armbands at issue in Tinker, Fraser’s 
speech was not political in nature, but was merely “lewd and 
indecent.”48 Where children are concerned, the Court held that the 
Constitution affords less protection to lewd and obscene 
expression.49 Second, because Fraser’s speech was given at a 
school assembly, the Court found it perfectly appropriate for the 
school to disassociate itself from the speech by punishing it.50 
Based on these distinctions, the Court declined to apply 
Tinker’s substantial and material interference test, and instead 
utilized a balancing test.51 The Court reasoned that Fraser’s First 
                                                          
44 Id. at 682-83. 
45 See id. at 681. “The undoubted freedom to advocate unpopular and 
controversial views in schools and classrooms must be balanced against the 
society’s countervailing interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially 
appropriate behavior.” Id. at 681. 
46 Id. Chief Justice Burger, quoting two historians, described the role and 
purpose of the American public school: “[Public] education must prepare pupils 
for citizenship in the Republic . . . It must inculcate the habits and manners of 
civility as values in themselves conducive to happiness and as indispensable to 
the practice of self-government in the community and the nation.” Id. (quoting 
CHARLES A. BEARD & MARY M. BEARD, NEW BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED 
STATES 228 (1968)). 
47 Id. at 683. 
48 Id. at 685. “Unlike the sanctions imposed on the students wearing the 
armbands in Tinker, the penalties imposed in this case were unrelated to any 
political viewpoint.” Id. 
49 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 684-85. Chief Justice Burger explicitly stated, “The 
speech could well be seriously damaging to its less mature audience, many of 
whom were only 14 years old and on the threshold of awareness of human 
sexuality.” Id. at 683. 
50 Id. at 685. 
51 Id. at 681-86. 
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Amendment interest in his freedom of expression must be weighed 
against the school’s interest in “[inculcating] fundamental values 
necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system.”52 
Here, Fraser’s interest in his freedom of expression was 
outweighed by the school’s need to preserve order and civility.53 
Chief Justice Burger went so far as to quote with approval from 
Justice Black’s dissent in Tinker: “‘I wish therefore, . . . to disclaim 
any purpose . . . to hold that the Federal Constitution compels the 
teachers, parents, and elected school officials to surrender control 
of the American public school system to public school students.’”54 
3. Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier:55 Legitimate 
Pedagogical Concern 
While Matthew Fraser was giving his speech at Bethel High 
School in April 1983,56 the students at the Spectrum, the student 
newspaper published in conjunction with the Journalism II class at 
Hazelwood East High School in St. Louis, Missouri, were 
preparing two pages of articles concerning teen pregnancy, 
marriage, juvenile delinquency, and divorce.57 One article 
contained quotes from several students, identified by name, about 
the impact of their parents’ divorce.58 Other articles concerned 
three Hazelwood students (who were not identified by name) who 
had become pregnant and discussed, in detail, their sexual activity 
and birth control practices.59 
                                                          
52 Id. (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979)). 
53 Id. at 685. “[Such] utterances are no essential part of any exposition of 
ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that 
may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order 
and morality.” Id. (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 
(1942)). 
54 Id. at 686 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 526) (Black, J., dissenting). 
55 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
56 Id. at 677. 
57 Id. at 264 n.1. 
58 Id. at 263. 
59 Id. See also, MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT: THE FIRST AMENDMENT 101 
(Peter Irons ed. 1997). 
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On May 10th, in accordance with established practice,60 the 
proof pages for the May 13th edition were submitted to Principal 
Robert E. Reynolds for prior review.61 Mr. Reynolds reviewed the 
proof and on May 11th determined that two articles—one 
concerning teen pregnancy and the other the impact of divorce on 
high school students—were inappropriate for the Spectrum.62 In 
order to remove the offending articles and still meet the press 
deadline, Reynolds decided to cut two pages from the six page 
proof, deleting a total of seven articles.63 Several students brought 
suit in United States District Court for the District of Missouri in 
January 1984, alleging that their First Amendment rights had been 
violated.64 After a bench trial, the district court concluded that the 
students’ First Amendment rights of freedom of speech and 
expression had not been violated.65 The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed in January 198666 and the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari in January 1987. 
In a 5-3 decision,67 the Supreme Court reversed the Eighth 
Circuit, ruling in favor of the school district. The Court narrowly 
framed the issue as “the extent to which educators may exercise 
                                                          
60 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 263. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 263-64. See also, Andrew H. Utterback, Hazelwood School District 
v. Kuhlmeier, in FREE SPEECH ON TRIAL: COMMUNICATION PERSPECTIVES ON 
LANDMARK SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 250, 251 (Richard A. Parker ed. 2003). 
64 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 264. The students alleged that Principal 
Reynolds’ actions amounted to an illegal, content-based prior restraint. More 
specifically, they claimed that the articles did not violate any pre-existing, 
established standard for editing articles from the Spectrum—none of the articles 
would have caused material and substantial disruption to the work. See 
Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School District, 578 F. Supp. 1286, 1289 (D.C. Mo. 
1984). 
65 Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 607 F. Supp. 1450, 1467 (D.C. Mo. 
1985). 
66 Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 795 F.2d 1368, 1370 (8th Cir. 
1986). 
67 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 262. The unusual 8-Justice vote was due to the 
fact that Justice Lewis Powell had just retired and Justice Anthony Kennedy had 
not yet been seated. 
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control over the contents of a high school newspaper produced as 
part of a school’s journalism class.”68 Acknowledging Tinker and 
Fraser, Justice White noted that although “[s]tudents in public 
schools do not ‘shed their constitutional rights to freedom of 
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate,’”69 a school is not 
required to tolerate speech that is “inconsistent with its ‘basic 
educational mission.’”70 
Central to the Court’s analysis was the impact of the public 
forum doctrine.71 Applying the public forum framework,72 the 
                                                          
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 266 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506). 
70 Id. (quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685). 
71 Id. at 267 (“We deal first with the question whether Spectrum [the school 
newspaper] may appropriately be characterized as a forum for public 
expression.”). This type of public forum analysis is frequently used by the 
federal courts to determine the scope of First Amendment protections in 
situations involving public property. See, e.g., Derek P. Langhauser, Free and 
Regulated Speech on Campus: Using Forum Analysis for Assessing Facility 
Use, Speech Zones, and Related Expressive Activity, 31 J.C. & U.L. 481 (2005); 
Thomas J. Davis, Assessing Constitutional Challenges to University Free 
Speech Zones Under Public Forum Doctrine, 79 IND. L.J. 267 (2004); see also, 
Laurence H. Tribe, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §12-24 (2nd ed. 1988). 
72 Id. In Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educator’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 
45-56 (1983), the Court defined the scope of the three categories of public 
forums. First, there are “traditional public forums”—places such as streets and 
parks that have “immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public.” Id. at 
45. In these “quintessential” public forums, the government may only impose 
restrictions on expressive activity if the regulation is narrowly tailored to 
effectuate a compelling state interest. Id. The government may also impose 
reasonable, content-neutral time, place and manner restrictions. Id. A limited 
public forum is public property that the State has opened for limited use by the 
public for certain expressive activity. Id. The government is not required to open 
this forum but, once it has, the same First Amendment standards apply as in a 
traditional public forum. Id. at 46. Non-public fora include government property 
that has been reserved for a specific purpose, based on the idea that “the State, 
no less than a private owner of property, has power to reserve the property under 
its control for the use to which it has been lawfully dedicated.” Id. Regulations 
here need only to be viewpoint-neutral and rationally related to a government 
interest. Id. 
 Two years later, in Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational 
Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985), the Court, quoting Perry, held that:  
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Court concluded that the Spectrum, as a “school-sponsored 
publication,” was a non-public forum, and as a result, school 
officials were entitled to regulate its contents in any “reasonable 
manner.”73 First and foremost, the Court looked to school board 
policy which provided that “[s]chool sponsored publications are 
developed within the adopted curriculum and its educational 
implications in regular classroom activities.”74 The Court went on 
to highlight other factors evincing government control: (1) the 
faculty advisor exercised a great deal of editorial control over the 
paper; (2) the Spectrum was published in conjunction with the 
Journalism II class for which students received grades and 
academic credit; and (3) it was established policy that the paper be 
submitted to the school principal for prior review.75 School 
administrators had reserved the paper for the specific purpose of 
teaching students about journalism under the guidance of an 
academic advisor.76 As such, they were constitutionally within 
their rights to “exercise editorial control over style and content” so 
long as their actions were “reasonably related to a legitimate 
pedagogical concern.”77 
                                                          
[t]he government does not create a public forum by inaction or by 
permitting limited discourse, but only by intentionally opening a non-
traditional forum for public discourse. Accordingly, the Court has 
looked to the policy and practice of the government to ascertain 
whether it intended to designate a place not traditionally open to 
assembly and debate as a public forum.  
(quoting Perry, 460 U.S. at 47) (internal citations omitted). 
73 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 267-70. Justice White stated that because public 
schools do not possess all the attributes of streets, parks and other “traditional 
public forums” that “time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, 
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.” Id. 
at 267 (quoting Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)). Thus, school 
facilities are only considered public forums if school officials have “by policy or 
practice” opened those facilities “for indiscriminate use by the general public,” 
or some segment of the public, such as the student body. Id. 
74 Id. at 268 (alterations in original) (citing Hazelwood School Board 
Policy). 
75 Id. at 268-69. 
76 Id. at 268. 
77 Id. at 273. 
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The Court explicitly distinguished its holding in Tinker, which 
related to a “student’s personal expression that happen[ed] to occur 
on the school premises.”78 In contrast, the Court in Hazelwood was 
concerned with whether the First Amendment required a school 
“affirmatively to promote particular student speech.”79 Hazelwood 
involved school-sponsored student speech that students, parents, 
and members of the community might “reasonably perceive to bear 
the imprimatur of the school.”80 To ensure that the “views of the 
individual speaker are not erroneously attributed to the school,” the 
Court held that school officials should have greater latitude to 
regulate such expressive activities.81 
Justice Brennan dissented,82 proclaiming that Principal 
Reynolds “used a paper shredder” on the free speech rights of the 
students without so much as considering obvious alternatives.83 He 
wrote, “[s]uch unthinking contempt for individual rights is 
intolerable from any state official. It is particularly insidious from 
the one to whom the public entrusts the task of inculcating in its 
youth an appreciation for the cherished democratic liberties that 
our Constitution guarantees.”84 
Brennan also found fault with what he termed the Court’s 
                                                          
78 Id. at 270-71. 
79 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 270-72. The Court went on to say that “A school must be able to 
set high standards for the student speech that is disseminated under its 
auspices—standards that may be higher than those demanded by some 
newspaper publishers or theatrical producers in the “real” world—and may 
refuse to disseminate student speech that does not meet those standards.” Id. at 
272. As such, “a school in its capacity as a publisher of a school newspaper or 
producer of a school play may “disassociate itself,” not only from speech that 
would “substantially interfere with [its] work. . .or impinge upon the rights of 
other students,” but also from speech that is, for example, ungrammatical, 
poorly written, inadequately researched, biased or prejudiced, vulgar or profane, 
or unsuitable for immature audiences.” Id. (internal citations omitted). 
82 For a more in-depth discussion of Justice Brennan’s dissent, see, e.g., 
Scott Andrew Felder, Stop the Presses: Censorship and the High School 
Journalist, 29 J.L. & EDUC. 443, 448-51 (2000). 
83 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 290 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
84 Id. 
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“taxonomy of school censorship”—concluding that Tinker applies 
to one type of speech and not another.85 He took issue with the 
majority’s distinction between a “student’s personal expression 
that happens to occur on the school premises” (as in Tinker), and 
school-subsidized or sponsored expression that the public might 
“reasonably believe to bear the imprimatur of the school.”86 He 
argued that “[t]he Court does not, for it cannot, purport to discern 
from our precedents the distinction it creates.”87 Brennan agreed 
that a school should be able to disassociate itself from speech that 
is “ungrammatical, poorly written, inadequately researched, biased 
or prejudiced,” but that to reach such a conclusion, the Court need 
not abandon Tinker, but apply it.88 He argued, “[t]he educator may, 
under Tinker, constitutionally ‘censor’ poor grammar, writing, or 
research because to reward such expression would ‘materially 
disrup[t] the newspaper’s curricular purpose.”89 
In a line now famous to student journalists, Justice Brennan 
concluded, “[t]he young men and women of Hazelwood East 
expected a civics lesson, but not the one the Court teaches them 
today.”90 
B. Reaction to Hazelwood 
Despite Hazelwood’s pronouncement that public schools could 
censor speech, the government does not retain absolute power to 
censor a nonpublic forum.91 The Court still requires that the 
                                                          
85 Id. at 281. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. Justice Brennan went on to explain that nowhere in Tinker did the 
Court touch on the personal nature of the speech. Moreover, “personal 
expression that happens to occur on school premises” does not accurately 
describe Fraser’s speech. He did not just “happen” to give his speech on school 
grounds. Quoting Fraser, Justice Brennan concluded “if ever a forum for 
student expression was ‘school-sponsored,’ Fraser’s was.” Yet, despite this 
apparent contradiction, the Fraser Court faithfully applied Tinker. Id. at 281-82. 
88 Id. at 283. 
89 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 284 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (alteration in 
original). 
90 Id. at 291. 
91 See e.g., Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 
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censorship be “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical 
concerns.”92 The rule of Hazelwood appears to be that unless the 
school is involved in the funding or promotion of the speech, 
expression by students must be tolerated. Nonetheless, legal 
scholars wondered whether there might be any limit to the 
“legitimate pedagogical concern” standard.93 Many questioned 
whether Hazelwood had effectively overruled Tinker.94 One 
                                                          
37, 45-46 (1983). 
92 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273. 
93 See, e.g., Walter E. Forehand, Constitutional Law—Tinkering with 
Tinker: Academic Freedom in the Public Schools—Hazelwood School District 
v. Kuhlmeier, 16 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 159, 182 (1988) (stating that Hazelwood 
does “not establish a sufficiently clear standard of evaluation for school board 
conduct”); Shari Golub, Tinker to Fraser to Hazelwood—Supreme Court’s 
Double Play Combination Defeats High School Students’ Rally for First 
Amendment Rights: Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 38 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 487, 513 (1989) (critiquing “the vague and broad ‘legitimate pedagogical 
concern’ standard”); Reene E. Rothauge, Seen But Not Heard: In What Forum 
May High School Students Exercise First Amendment Rights After Hazelwood?, 
25 WILLIAMETTE L. REV. 197, 218 (1989) (“Students’ First Amendment rights 
will be subject to the parochial whims of district school boards.”). 
94 See e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, supra note 35 (arguing that despite 
Hazelwood and Fraser, there remain First Amendment protections for non-
curricular student speech and poses no threat of disruption); Mark Yudof, Tinker 
Tailored: Good Faith, Civility, and Student Expression, 69 St. JOHN’S L. REV. 
365 (1995) (noting that although Fraser and Hazelwood did not specifically 
overrule Tinker, they have greatly altered its holding); Andrew D.M. Miller, 
Balancing School Authority and Student Expression, 54 BAYLOR L. REV. 623, 
645 (2002) (“Certainly, neither Fraser nor Kuhlmeier explicitly overruled 
Tinker, and it more than arguable that neither implicitly overruled it); J. Marc 
Abrams & S. Mark Goodman, End of an Era? The Decline of Student Press 
Rights in the Wake of Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 1988 DUKE L.J. 
706, 707 (“[Hazelwood] eviscerates the Supreme Court’s decision in Tinker, 
overrules many lower-court decisions protective of the student press, and 
curtails student press rights established for well over a generation.”); Thomas C. 
Fischer, Whatever Happened to Mary Beth Tinker and other Sagas in the 
Marketplace of Ideas, 23 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 351, 411 (1993) (arguing 
that current jurisprudence is more closely akin to Justice Black’s dissenting view 
in Tinker, “[a]ll this without Tinker being reversed, or even cited unfavorably.”); 
Clay Wiesenberger, Constitution or Conformity: When the Shirt Hits the Fan in 
Public Schools, J.L. & EDUC. 51, 55 (2000) (“It can be argued that Tinker has 
been overruled, at least partially.”). 
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commentator even went so far as to describe Hazelwood as a 
“tsunami that has wiped out all that existed before.”95 
Despite the confusion, Hazelwood’s impact was immediate.96 
Less than an hour after the Court’s decision was announced on the 
radio, a high school principal censored an article on AIDS.97 That 
same day, in another high school, the entire staff of a school-
sponsored newspaper resigned, and instead began work on an 
underground newspaper.98 In fact, the Student Press Law Center 
(SPLC), a non-profit group that provides legal support and advice 
to student media outlets, has reported an increase in the number of 
inquiries concerning censorship it has received for every year since 
Hazelwood. In 1996, SPLC received a record 221 requests for legal 
help from high school student journalists or their advisors.99 In 
2002, SPLC recorded 529 such requests—an increase of nearly 
240%.100 SPLC Executive Director Mark Goodman attributes the 
continual increase to the Court’s decision in Hazelwood, noting 
that it has “essentially gutted the First Amendment in many of 
America’s High Schools.”101 
Since Hazelwood was handed down, its rationale has been 
expanded to encompass all forms of student expression. High 
school teachers and administrators have broadly interpreted 
Hazelwood as a grant of authority to “control student expression 
for the sake of preserving the institutional and educational integrity 
of public schools.”102 Its reasoning has been extended beyond the 
                                                          
95 See, Abrams & Goodman, supra note 94, at 728. 
96 For a general analysis of the impact of Hazelwood, see e.g., Carol S. 
Lomicky, Analysis of High School Newspaper Editorials Before and After 
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier: A Content Analysis Case Study, 29 
J.L. & EDUC. 463 (2000). 
97 WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 1988, at A27. 
98 L.A. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1988, at 8. 
99 High School Censorship Calls Soar in ‘97, STUDENT PRESS L. CENTER 
REP., Fall 1998, at 3. 
100 Legal Requests to the SPLC Continue to Grow: Censorship Questions 
from College Journalists Show Dramatic Increase, STUDENT PRESS L. CENTER 
REP., Fall 2003, at 3. 
101 High School Censorship Calls Soar in ‘97, supra note 99, at 3. 
102 Bruce O. Hafen & Jonathan O. Hafen, The Hazelwood Progeny: 
Autonomy and Student Expression in the 1990s, 69 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 379, 396 
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realm of the student press and applied to a variety of First 
Amendment issues,103 including student attire and appearance,104 
school mascots,105 curriculum decisions,106 faculty speech,107 
academic freedom,108 and student speech at school assemblies and 
graduation ceremonies.109 
Moreover, although the Court’s decision in Hazelwood allowed 
for censorship of student speech, local officials remain free to 
determine the appropriate level of regulation.110 In the years after 
                                                          
(1995). See also Rosemary Salomone, Free Speech and School Governance in 
the Wake of Hazelwood, 26 GA. L. REV. 253, 274-306 (1993) (the decisions 
typically grant to school officials “broader legal discretion in molding student 
thought and opinion and consequently expression into a shape that conforms 
with the dominant values of the community.”) Id. at 315; Stanley Ingber, 
Rediscovering the Communal Worth of Individual Rights: The First Amendment 
in Institutional Contexts, 69 TEX L. REV. 1, 86 (1990) (arguing that the use of 
Hazelwood to restrict certain expression is likely send students “mixed signals 
about the intellectual traits that citizens require.”) Id. 
103 For a more detailed discussion of case law in the wake of Hazelwood, 
see, e.g., Laura K. Shulz, A “Disacknowledgment” of Post-Secondary Student 
Free-SpeechBrown v. Li and the Applicability of Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier to 
the Post-Secondary Setting, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 1185 (2003); Martha M. 
McCarthy, Post-Hazelwood Developments: A Threat to Free Inquiry in Public 
Schools, 81 ED. LAW REP. 685 (1993); Floyd G. Delon, “The More Things 
Change. . .”: Re-Emerging Student First Amendment Rights Issues, 59 ED. LAW 
REP. 963 (1990); Hafen & Hafen, supra note 102; Mark J. Fiore, Trampling the 
“Marketplace of Ideas”: The Case Against Extending Hazelwood to College 
Campuses, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1915 (2002). 
104 See, e.g., Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524 (9th Cir. 
1992); Baxter v. Vigo Country Sch. Dist., 26 F.3d 728 (7th Cir. 1994); Boroff v. 
Van Wert City Bd. of Educ., 220 F.3d 465 (6th Cir. 2000). 
105 See, e.g., Crosby v. Holsinger, 852 F.2d 801 (4th Cir. 1988). 
106 See, e.g., Virgil v. Sch. Bd. of Columbia Cty., 862 F.2d 1517 (11th Cir. 
1989); Kirkland v. Northside Independent Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 
1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 926 (1990). 
107 See, e.g., Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448 (1st Cir. 1993); Miles v. Denver 
Public Sch., 994 F.2d 773 (10th Cir. 1991). 
108 See, e.g., Webster v. New Lenox Sch. Dist. No. 122, 917 F.2d 1004 (7th 
Cir. 1990). 
109 See, e.g., Poling v. Murphy, 872 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 
493 U.S. 1021 (1989); Brody v. Spang, 957 F.2d 1108 (3d Cir. 1992). 
110 See, e.g., SPLC, STATE ANTI-HAZELWOOD LEGISLATION FACES 
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Hazelwood, numerous states passed legislation establishing various 
degrees of protection.111 Most recently, legislatures in three states 
have considered changes to laws governing student speech and 
expression.112 
Finally, though numerous lower federal courts have 
contemplated Hazelwood’s applicability at the university level,113 
                                                          
SUCCESSES, DEFEATS, REPORT, Spring 1999, at 12; SPLC, ANTI-HAZELWOOD 
CAMPAIGNS LAUNCHED IN 3 STATES, Spring 2005, at 4, available at 
http://splc.org/report_edition.asp?id=36. 
111 Iowa’s Student Exercise of Free Expression statute is typical. IOWA 
CODE ANN. §280.22 (2005), enacted May 11, 1989, clearly states, “students of 
the public schools have the right to exercise freedom of speech, including the 
right of expression in official school publications.” Id. § 280.22(1). The Code 
limits student expression in so far as it may not include materials which are 
obscene, libelous or slanderous, or which encourage students to commit 
unlawful acts, violate school rules, or cause the material and substantial 
disruption of the operation of the school. Id. § 280.22(2). See also Arkansas 
Student Publications Act, ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-1201 – 6-18-1204 (2005); 
Rights of Free Expression for Public School Students, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
22-1-120 (2005); The Student Publications Act, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-1504 – 
1506 (2004); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.71, § 82 (West 2005); The California 
Student Free Expression Law, CAL. EDUC. CODE §48907 (West 2005); The 
Pennsylvania Administrative Code on Student Rights and Responsibilities, 22 
PA. CODE § 12.9 (2005); The Washington Administrative Code on Student 
Rights, WASH. ADMIN. CODE 180-40-215 (2005). 
112 SPLC Report, ANTI-HAZELWOOD CAMPAIGNS LAUNCHED IN 3 STATES, 
supra note 110. 
113 See Vanderhurst v. Colo. Mountain Coll. Dist., 208 F.3d 908, 915 (10th 
Cir. 2000) (“We need not decide definitively, however, whether that framework 
does in fact govern a public college or university’s control over the classroom 
speech of a professor or other instructor.”); Cummins v. Campbell, 44 F.3d 847 
(10th Cir. 1994); Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1074 (11th Cir. 1991) 
(“[I]nsofar as [Hazelwood] covers the extent to which an institution may limit 
in-school expressions which suggest the school’s approval, we adopt the Court’s 
reasoning as suitable to our ends, even at the university level.”); Ala. Student 
Party v. Student Gov’t Ass’n of the Univ. of Ala., 867 F.2d 1344 (11th Cir. 
1989) (applying Hazelwood’s framework to determine that a university’s student 
government association did not constitute a public forum); Welker v. Cicerone, 
174 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1065 n.6 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (citing Hazelwood for the 
proposition that there exists a “relaxed First Amendment standard” on college 
campuses.); Lueth v. St. Clair County Cmty. Coll., 732 F. Supp. 2d 1410 (E.D. 
Mich. 1990) (employing a critical comparison of student-run newspapers in high 
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no consensus has yet been achieved. As one commentator noted, 
“the only consistency that is apparent . . . is confusion.”114 
C. Student Speech in Post-Secondary Education 
The Hazelwood Court did not address the First Amendment 
rights of college and university students. However, the Hazelwood 
court did briefly mention the issue of free speech and higher 
education in a footnote:  
A number of lower federal courts have . . . recognized that 
educators’ decisions with regard to the content of school-
sponsored newspapers, dramatic productions, and other 
expressive activities are entitled to substantial deference. 
We need not now decide whether the same degree of 
deference is appropriate with respect to school-sponsored 
expressive activities at the college and university level.115  
In fact, until the recent decision in Hosty v. Carter, Hazelwood had 
never been read as controlling outside the high school setting. 
The ratification of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment in 1971,116 
lowering the voting age to eighteen, essentially transformed 
college students into legal adults. Accordingly, courts have 
generally afforded college and university students broad First 
Amendment protections. In the early 1970s, the Supreme Court 
decided two cases that defined the free speech rights of students on 
college and university campuses. Unlike Hazelwood, these cases 
stood for the proposition that the First Amendment should apply 
with equal force, both on and off campus. While the Court 
emphasized the need for order and control, it held university 
officials to a much more strict standard than that articulated in 
Hazelwood. 
                                                          
schools and colleges, and concluding that Hazelwood is not applicable in a post-
secondary setting.). 
114 Schulz, supra note 103, at 1198. 
115 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273 n. 7 (citations omitted). 
116 “The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age 
or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any 
State on account of age.” U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, §1. 
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The first of these decisions, Healy v. James,117 was handed 
down in 1972. In Healy, Central Connecticut State College denied 
official recognition to a group of students who wanted to form a 
local chapter of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS).118 
Pursuant to procedures established by the College, the students 
petitioned the Student Affairs Committee for recognition.119 The 
Committee, while satisfied with the stated purposes of the 
group,120 harbored some concern over the relationship between the 
proposed local chapter and the National SDS organization.121 
Ultimately, though the Committee voted to approve the group, the 
President of the College rejected the recommendation.122 As a 
result, the students filed suit in district court claiming a violation of 
their First Amendment rights of expression and association 
stemming from the denial of recognition.123 
The district court found for the school, holding that the First 
Amendment did not require the College to approve of an 
organization it believed “likely to cause violent acts of 
disruption.”124 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
affirmed.125 The Supreme Court reversed.126 The Court identified 
                                                          
117 Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972). 
118 Id. at 170. 
119 Id. at 172. 
120 Id. The group’s petition specified three distinct purposes: “It would 
provide a forum of discussion and self-education for students developing an 
analysis of American society; it would serve as an agency for integrating 
thought with action so as to bring about constructive changes; and it would 
endeavor to provide a coordinating body for relating the problems of leftist 
students with other interested groups on campus and in the community.” Id. 
(internal citations omitted). 
121 The Court began by noting that the setting for this case was 1969-1970, 
a period of unrest and often violence on campuses across the country. The 
conflict in Vietnam sparked widespread civil disobedience and, noted the Court, 
“SDS chapters on some of those campuses had been a catalytic force during this 
period.” Id. at 171. Information on the SDS movement throughout the country is 
available at http://www.sds.revolt.org/index.htm. 
122 Healy, 408 U.S. at 175. 
123 Id. at 177. 
124 Healy v. James, 319 F. Supp. 113, 116 (D.C. Conn. 1970). 
125 Healy v. James, 445 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1971). 
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the conflicting interests at stake as those of students, faculty, and 
administrators in maintaining an “environment free from disruptive 
interference with the educational process,”127 and the “interest in 
the widest latitude for free expression and debate consonant with 
the maintenance of order.”128 
Justice Powell’s analysis began with Tinker, acknowledging 
that the First Amendment applies at the collegiate level.129 Further, 
Powell noted that it is well established that both the State and 
school officials have a need “consistent with fundamental 
constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the 
schools,”130 and, as per Tinker, to prohibit actions which 
“materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the 
school.”131 The Court, however, went on to distinguish Healy from 
Tinker, noting that college students deserved the same 
constitutional protections as the general public: 
[T]he precedents of this Court leave no room for the view 
that, because of the acknowledged need for order, First 
Amendment protections should apply with less force on 
college campuses than in the community at large. Quite to 
the contrary, “[t]he vigilant protection of constitutional 
freedoms is no where more vital than in the community of 
American schools.” The college classroom with its 
surrounding environs is peculiarly the “marketplace of 
ideas,” and we break no new constitutional ground in 
reaffirming this Nation’s dedication to safeguarding 
academic freedom.132 
                                                          
126 Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972). 
127 Id. at 171. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 180. “At the outset we note that state colleges and universities are 
not enclaves immune from the sweep of the First Amendment. ‘It can hardly be 
argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom 
of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.’” Id. (quoting Tinker v. Des 
Moines, 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)). 
130 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
131 Id. at 189. (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513). 
132 Healy, 408 U.S. at 180-81. (internal citations omitted). See also 
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (holding “[o]ur Nation 
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The Court noted that while a college’s “legitimate interest in 
preventing disruption on campus”133 might justify certain 
restraints, a “heavy burden rests on the college to demonstrate the 
appropriateness of the action.”134 That burden, said the Court, is 
not met simply because the college declares the views expressed 
by a particular group to be “abhorrent.”135 
Less than one year after Healy, the Supreme Court again 
addressed the issue of university student speech in Papish v. Board 
of Curators of the University of Missouri.136 Barbara Papish, a 
graduate student at the University of Missouri School of 
Journalism, was expelled for distributing on campus an outside 
newspaper that contained a cartoon depicting a policeman raping 
the Statue of Liberty and the Goddess of Justice.137 Below the 
cartoon was a caption that read “With Liberty and Justice for 
All.”138 The issue also contained an article entitled “Motherfucker 
                                                          
is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom.”); United States v. 
Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (holding “[t]he 
Nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that 
robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth out of a multitude of tongues, 
[rather] than through any kind of authoritative selection.”); Sweezy v. State of 
N.H., 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957): 
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American 
universities is almost self-evident. No one should underestimate 
the vital role in a democracy that is played by those who guide and 
train our youth. To impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual 
leaders in our colleges and universities would imperil the future of 
our Nation. No field of education is so thoroughly comprehended 
by man that new discoveries cannot yet be made. Particularly is 
that true in the social sciences, where few, if any, principles are 
accepted as absolutes. Scholarship cannot flourish in an 
atmosphere of suspicion and distrust. Teachers and students must 
always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new 
maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization will 
stagnate and die. 
133 Healy v. James, 404 U.S. 169, 184 (1972). 
134 Id. 
135 Id. at 187-88. 
136 410 U.S. 667 (1973). 
137 Id. at 667. 
138 Id. 
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Acquitted,” which discussed the trial and acquittal of a New York 
City youth who was a member of an organization called “Up 
Against the Wall, Motherfucker.”139 Papish was expelled for 
violation of the bylaws of the Board of Curators.140 She sued, 
claiming that her activities were protected by the First 
Amendment.141 
In a per curiam opinion, the Court first noted that although 
university officials undoubtedly have an ability to enforce 
reasonable standards of student conduct, “Healy makes it clear that 
the mere dissemination of ideas—no matter how offensive to good 
taste—on a state university campus may not be shut off in the 
name alone of ‘conventions of decency’” alone.142 The record 
demonstrated that Papish was expelled because the school 
disapproved of the content of the newspaper.143 Accordingly, the 
University’s actions could not be viewed as a legitimate exercise of 
its authority to enforce reasonable restrictions.144 The Court 
concluded that “the First Amendment leaves no room for the 
operation of a dual standard in the academic community with 
respect to the content of speech.”145 
In the more than thirty years since Healy and Papish, the 
Supreme Court has not wavered. Rather, more recent decisions 
emphasize the Court’s commitment to upholding First Amendment 
rights on college and university campuses. For example, in 
                                                          
139 Id. at 667-68. 
140 Id. at 668. The bylaws stated, in pertinent part: 
Students enrolling in the University assume an obligation and are 
expected by the University to conduct themselves in a manner 
compatible with the University’s functions and missions as an 
educational institution. For that purpose students are required to 
observe generally accepted standards of conduct . . . . [I]ndecent 
conduct or speech . . . are examples of conduct which would 
contravene this standard. 
Id. (quoting Papish v. Board of Curators of the Univ. of Missouri, 464 F.2d 136, 
138 (8th Cir. 1972)) (alterations in original). 
141 Id. at 669. 
142 Papish, 410 U.S. at 670. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. at 671. 
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Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia,146 
the Court held that the First Amendment prohibited a university 
from denying funding to student publications, produced as 
extracurricular activities, based on the views expressed therein.147 
At issue in Rosenberger was a student-run publication, Wide 
Awake, which provided a Christian perspective on community 
issues.148 When Wide Awake Productions (WAP) requested money 
from the Student Activity Fund (SAF) to cover the cost of 
printing,149 its request was denied on the ground that Wide Awake 
was a “religious activity” within the meaning of the school’s 
guidelines.150 Unable to obtain funding, several members of the 
group sued the University alleging that refusal to authorize 
payment of printing costs violated their rights to freedom of speech 
and press, to the free exercise of religion, and to equal protection 
of the law.151 
The Supreme Court held in favor of the students.152 The Court 
found that because the University had offered to pay third-party 
contractors on behalf of private speakers to convey their own 
messages, it was not entitled to “silence the expression of selected 
                                                          
146 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
147 Id. at 845. 
148 Id. at 825-26. Wide Awake was published by a student group known as 
“Wide Awake Productions” (WAP). WAP was established “[t]o publish a 
magazine of philosophical and religious expression,” “[t]o facilitate discussion 
which fosters an atmosphere of sensitivity to and tolerance of Christian 
viewpoints,” and “[t]o provide a unifying focus for Christians of multicultural 
backgrounds.” Id. (citing party brief). 
149 The University had established a Student Activity Fund (SAF) into 
which all students were required to pay a fee. According to University 
guidelines, the Student Council was authorized to disburse the funds to a variety 
of student groups and organizations. Id. at 824-25. 
150 Id. at 826. Excluded from Student Activity Fund support were religious 
activities and political activities, among others. The Guidelines defined a 
“religious activity” as any activity that “primarily promotes or manifests a 
particular belie[f] in or about a deity or an ultimate reality.” Id. at 825. (internal 
citations omitted). 
151 Id. at 827. 
152 Papish, 410 U.S. at 845-46. 
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viewpoints.”153 Accordingly, WAP could not constitutionally be 
denied funding on the ground that it espoused a certain religious 
perspective. Justice Kennedy explained: 
Vital First Amendment speech principles are at stake here. 
The first danger to liberty lies in granting the State the 
power to examine publications to determine whether or not 
they are based on some ultimate idea and, if so, for the 
State to classify them. The second, and corollary, danger is 
to speech from the chilling of individual thought and 
expression. That danger is especially real in the University 
setting, where the State acts against a background and 
tradition of thought and experiment that is at the center of 
our intellectual and philosophic tradition.154 
The Court concluded that the University’s viewpoint-based denial 
of funding for certain student expression amounted to “suppression 
of free speech and creative inquiry in one of the vital centers for 
the Nation’s intellectual life, its college and university 
campuses.”155 
Five years later in Board of Regents of the University of 
Wisconsin System v. Southworth,156 the Supreme Court again 
examined the First Amendment issues surrounding student-funded 
speech. In Southworth, several students brought a First 
Amendment claim against the University arguing that the 
imposition of a mandatory activity fee violated their First 
Amendment rights to free speech, free association, and free 
exercise.157 
The Supreme Court, balancing the First Amendment rights of 
those students forced to subsidize the “objectionable speech of 
others” against the University’s mission of encouraging a wide 
range of speech,158 rejected the idea that the University should be 
                                                          
153 Id. at 835. 
154 Id. (citing, Healy, 408 U.S. at 180-81; Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 683-84; 
Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 250). 
155 Id. at 836. 
156 529 U.S. 217 (2000). 
157 Id. at 227. 
158 Id. at 231. The Court went on to reaffirm the idea that college and 
university campuses represent the “quintessential marketplace of ideas,” and the 
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required to restrict the types of ideas exchanged on campus.159 
Justice Kennedy explained, “[t]he speech at the University . . . is 
distinguished not by discernable limits but by its vast, unexplored 
bounds.”160 Thus, requiring a school to limit student expression 
“would be contrary to the very goal the University seeks to 
pursue.”161 
II. HOSTY V. CARTER162 
James Tidwell, journalism professor and acting chair of the 
department of journalism at Eastern Illinois University, recently 
said, “In college and professional media, when a big decision 
comes down, we tend to go around screaming, ‘The sky is 
falling.’. . . When of course it isn’t.”163 The sky might not be 
falling, but the storm clouds are certainly gathering. The Seventh 
Circuit’s decision in Hosty v. Carter represents the first 
unequivocal application of Hazelwood to post-secondary student 
press,164 and stands in direct conflict with decisions in both the 
                                                          
school, as an agent of the State, seeks to “stimulate the whole universe of speech 
and ideas.” Id. at 232. 
159 Id. at 231. 
160 Id. at 232. 
161 Id. 
162 412 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2005) (en banc), cert. denied, 164 L. Ed. 2d 47 
(2006). 
163 SPLC News Flash, Student Media Experts React to Governors State 
University Ruling, June 22, 2005; available at http://www.splc.org/newsflash. 
asp?id=1039. 
164 In Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 
908, the Ninth Circuit applied Hazelwood, upholding as constitutional the 
University of Santa Barbara’s refusal to grant a degree and file a master’s thesis 
in its library system until Brown, a candidate for a master’s degree, removed 
two pages of “disacknowledgments.” Id. at 943. The disacknowledgments page 
began, “I would like to offer special Fuck You’s to the following degenerates.” 
Id. Although the court applied Hazelwood’s framework, this case dealt with 
speech that was decidedly part of the curriculum and that was considered 
indecent. Therefore, although analogous in some respects to Hosty, because it 
did not deal with student press, further discussion is beyond the scope of this 
note. For a more comprehensive analysis of Brown, see e.g., Tom Saunders, The 
Limits on University Control of Graduate Student Speech, 112 YALE L.J. 1295 
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First and Sixth Circuits.165 The case has a lengthy procedural 
history, including an unreported district court decision166 which 
was affirmed by a Seventh Circuit panel.167 The full Seventh 
Circuit, however, vacated the panel decision, and after rehearing 
the case en banc, reversed the district court, holding in favor of the 
University.168 On February 21, 2006, the United States Supreme 
Court denied the students’ petition for certiorari, allowing the 
Seventh Circuit’s decision to stand.169 The ruling carries with it 
strong implications for the future of student speech and, especially 
when viewed in light of the historical development of students’ 
free speech and press rights, is cause for alarm. 
A. The Facts of Hosty v. Carter 
As is true with most cases implicating the free speech rights of 
students, Hosty involved a clash between a school’s administration 
and its students. Governors State University (hereinafter 
“Governors State” or “GSU”) is a state-run institution in 
University Park, Illinois.170 With a student population of over 
6,000, the school defines itself as an “upper-level university,” 
offering undergraduate courses at the junior and senior level 
leading to completion of a baccalaureate degree and graduate level 
courses leading to a master’s degree.171 The now defunct 
                                                          
(2003). 
165 Student Gov’t Ass’n v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Mass, 868 F.2d 473, 
480 n.6 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding that Hazelwood “is not applicable to college 
newspapers.”); Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342, 346 n.5 (6th Cir. 2001) (en 
banc) (holding that Hazelwood had “little application” to a case involving 
censorship of a college yearbook). 
166 Hosty v. Governors State Univ., No. 01-C-500, 2001 WL 1465621 
(N.D. Ill. 2001). 
167 Hosty v. Carter, 325 F.3d 945 (7th Cir. 2003). 
168 See Hosty, 412 F.3d at 739 (determining that the school, and specifically 
Dean Carter, had not violated the students’ First Amendment rights). 
169 Hosty v. Carter, 421 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 164 L. Ed. 
2d 47 (2006). 
170 Information regarding Governors State University is available on the 
University’s website, http://www.govst.edu. 
171 Id. 
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INNOVATOR172 is described as “the bimonthly student newspaper 
and [] the main source of information about campus life.”173 
Controversy surrounding the publication and, in particular, its last 
issue, sparked the current lawsuit. 
When the case began, the three plaintiffs in Hosty, Jeni Porche, 
Margaret Hosty, and Steven Barba, were students at Governors 
State, appointed in May 2000 by the school’s Student 
Communications Media Board (SCMB) to serve as the 
INNOVATOR’s editor-in-chief, managing editor, and staff reporter, 
respectively.174 According to SCMB guidelines at the time, the 
staff of the INNOVATOR was responsible for determining the 
content and format of the paper “without censorship or advance 
approval.”175 The paper’s faculty advisor, Geoffroy de LaForcade, 
often read stories intended for publication and offered guidance on 
issues of journalistic standards and ethics.176 Although it was 
customary for the advisor to sign-off on each edition before it was 
sent to the printer, the student editors and writers were given 
complete editorial control concerning the paper’s subject matter 
and content.177 GSU had a contract with Regional Publishing 
Corporation to print the Innovator on a bi-monthly basis,178 with 
the cost of publication covered entirely by money from Student 
Activity Fees.179 
                                                          
172 Id. The last issue was published on October 31, 2000 and, in the fall of 
2002, a new incarceration of the newspaper appeared at GSU, calling itself the 
Phoenix. 
173 Id. 
174 Hosty, 325 F.3d at 946. 
175 Id.; see also the GSU Student Handbook, Student Media Policy 
(declaring that the “[t]he staff will determine the content and format of their 
respective publications without censorship or advance approval.”), available at, 
http://www.collegefreedom.org/GSUhandbook.htm. 
176 Hosty, 2001 WL 1465621 at *1. 
177 Id. 
178 Id. 
179 According to the GSU website, “The Student Activity fee is $32 per 
trimester. The fee supports programs and activities to enrich the extracurricular 
life of students.” This fee is mandatory and, once collected, is deposited into the 
Student Activity Fund. For a more thorough explanation of the collection and 
distribution of fees, see http://www.govst.edu/ sas/t_hb.asp?id=2995. 
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According de LaForcade, the INNOVATOR made “great strides 
as a serious newspaper and a voice for students’ interests.”180 
Porche, Hosty, and the rest of the staff were determined to 
establish a reputable, informative and critical publication—a goal 
they made clear in the premiere issue, published July 10, 2000, 
under an editorial entitled “New Beginnings.”181 The editorial read, 
in part, “[w]e look forward to having a productive year and raising 
important issues concerning life at GSU. By making these issues 
public, we hope to spark debates that will enhance the educational 
environment for everyone.”182 
After articles bearing Hosty’s by-line attacked the integrity of 
Roger K. Oden, Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences, the 
University’s administration began to take an interest in the 
paper.183 On October 31, 2000, the INNOVATOR published a letter 
to the editor from de Laforcade whose employment with the 
University had been terminated effective August 31, 2000.184 The 
same issue of the paper also contained an article entitled “De 
Laforcade’s Contract Dispute Reaches 3rd Phase Arbitration,” 
under the by-line of M.L. Hosty.185 In response to the letter and 
article, both Dean Oden and Stuart Fagan, President of the 
University, issued statements accusing the INNOVATOR of 
irresponsible and defamatory journalism. Oden wrote, “Geoffrey 
de Laforcade’s letter to the editor and M. L. Hosty’s article is [sic] 
a collection of untruths and I believe that they know they are 
untrue.”186 President Fagan, describing the October 31st issue as 
“an angry barrage of unsubstantiated allegations,” vowed not to 
                                                          
180 Press Statement by Faculty Advisor, Geoffroy de LaForcade (Feb. 16, 
2001); available at http://www.collegefreedom.org/Advisor21601.htm. 
181 Email conversation with Margaret L. Hosty, Nov. 4, 2005. On file with 
author. 
182 Id. 
183 Hosty, 412 F.3d at 732-33. 
184 Dean Roger Oden’s denunciation of the INNOVATOR (Nov. 2, 2000), 
available at http://www.collegefreedom.org/Oden.htm. 
185 The front page of the October 31, 2000 issue of the INNOVATOR is 
available on the Student Press Law Center’s website at http://www.splc.org/ 
pdf/innovator.pdf. 
186 Oden, supra note 184. 
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“sit idly by, without comment, and allow the reputation of the 
university to be sullied by newspaper reporting that is inaccurate, 
insulting, and that might be driven, in part, by self-interest.”187 
In late October and early November of 2000, Patricia Carter, 
Dean of Student Affairs and Services, twice called Charles 
Richards, president of Regional Publishing.188 In those calls, Dean 
Carter told Richards not to print future issues of the INNOVATOR 
without prior approval of the newspaper’s content by a GSU 
administrator.189 She instructed Richards to call her when he 
received future issues.190 
In a November 14, 2000 memo delivered to the staff at the 
INNOVATOR, Richards relayed the substance of his conversations 
with Dean Carter.191 Richards stated that he had agreed to call 
Carter regarding future issues of the paper but noted that his 
understanding was that the law precluded a condition of approval 
prior to printing.192 However, he also noted that he was “not an 
attorney, so the final decision on the proper handling of this matter 
should not be left to [him].”193 The INNOVATOR’s staff 
interpreted Richards’ comments to mean that Regional Publishing 
would not print additional editions of the paper until the issue of 
prior review was settled.194 A company representative confirmed 
that it was not willing to risk printing the paper and not getting 
paid195 and publication stopped in November 2000.196 
Carter’s demand for prior review and approval prompted 
Hosty, Porche and Barba to file suit in April 2001 in United States 
                                                          
187 Governors State University President Fagan denounces the 
INNOVATOR (Nov. 3, 2000), available at http://www.collegefreedom.org/ 
Fagan.htm. 
188 Hosty, 412 F.3d at 733. 
189 Hosty, 325 F.3d at 947. 
190 Id. 





195 Hosty, 325 F.3d at 947. 
196 Id. 
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District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern 
Division.197 The students sued the University, the Board of 
Trustees, administrators and staff members, alleging prior restraint 
in violation of the First Amendment and entitlement to equitable 
relief and punitive damages.198 Summary judgment was granted as 
to some defendants because, in the district court judge’s view, they 
did not participate in the challenged conduct;199 others were 
granted qualified immunity.200 The district court found, however, 
that there was sufficient evidence to show that Dean Carter’s 
phone calls amounted to an unconstitutional prior restraint and that 
her conduct was intentionally unlawful, negating her claim to 
qualified immunity.201 Dean Carter appealed, and, on April 10, 
2003, a panel of the Seventh Circuit unanimously affirmed the 
order of the district court and remanded the case for trial.202 On 
June 23, 2003, however, the Seventh Circuit granted Carter’s 
petition for a rehearing en banc, and vacated its April 10th 
decision.203 
                                                          
197 Hosty v. Governors St. Univ., 174 F. Supp. 2d 782 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 13, 
2001). 
198 Id. at 783. 
199 Hosty, 2001 WL 1465621, *4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 13, 2001). The students 
sued for alleged First Amendment violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983. As 
the district court noted, “In §1983 actions, an individual cannot be held liable 
unless he caused or participated in the asserted constitutional violation.” Id. 
Plaintiffs claimed that certain individuals at the school failed to adequately 
investigate Dean Carter’s phone calls. However, summary judgment was 
granted with respect to these individuals because, as the court noted, “[a] 
supervisor’s negligence in detecting unconstitutional conduct is insufficient to 
hold the supervisor liable.” Id. 
200 Id. at *5. As the district court noted, according to the doctrine of 
qualified immunity, “government officials performing discretionary functions, 
generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct 
does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 
reasonable person would have known.” Id. (internal citations omitted). 
201 Id. at *7. Ultimately, the district court granted the motion for summary 
judgment to all except for Dean Patricia Carter. 
202 Hosty, 325 F.3d at 950. 
203 Id. at 731. 
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B. Hosty v. Carter: Seventh Circuit En Banc Decision 
By a 7-4 vote, the full Seventh Circuit reversed the order of the 
district court and sent the seventeen-year-old Hazelwood doctrine 
to college.204 Judge Easterbrook, writing for the majority, declared 
that Hazelwood’s footnote seven205 was not dispositive.206 Simply 
because the Supreme Court reserved the question did not mean that 
post-secondary educators may never insist that student newspapers 
be subject to prior approval. According to the majority, “this 
footnote does not even hint at the possibility of an on/off switch: 
high school papers reviewable, college papers not reviewable. . . . 
Whether some review is possible depends on the answer to the 
public forum question, which does not (automatically) vary with 
the speakers’ age.”207 Because age is not dispositive where a public 
forum analysis applies, the court concluded that “Hazelwood’s 
framework applies to subsidized student newspapers at colleges as 
well as elementary and secondary schools.”208 
The court then addressed whether the INNOVATOR should be 
                                                          
204 Hosty, 412 F.3d at 731. 
205 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 n.7 (1988) (“We 
need not now decide whether the same degree of deference is appropriate with 
respect to school-sponsored expressive activities at the college and university 
level.”). 
206 Hosty, 412 F.3d at 734. 
207 Id. 
208 Id. at 735. In his analysis, Easterbrook noted that to the extent that the 
justification for editorial control hinges on the audience’s maturity, the 
difference between high school and college students may be important. Id. at 
734. Easterbrook hedged this declaration, however, reasoning that there could be 
no bright line between college and high school students, as many high school 
seniors are older than some college freshmen, and that many junior colleges are 
strikingly similar to high schools. Id. Further, the court concluded that to the 
extent that the justification for editorial control depends on other matters, such 
as the desire to ensure high standards of student speech, i.e., speech that might 
be deemed ungrammatical, poorly written, inadequately researched, vulgar or 
profane, or unsuitable for immature audiences, there is no sharp difference 
between student newspapers at the high school and college levels. Id. at 734-35. 
For a discussion of the public forum doctrine and its general applicability, see 
supra note 72. 
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characterized as a public forum.209 If the paper had operated as a 
public forum, the First Amendment would have prohibited the 
University’s prior restraint.210 If, however, the INNOVATOR 
operated as a nonpublic forum, there could be no First Amendment 
violation as long as Dean Carter’s insistence on prior review was 
motivated by “legitimate pedagogical concerns.”211 Based on the 
record, the majority found it impossible to determine what kind of 
forum the University had established or to evaluate Carter’s 
motivation.212 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the student plaintiffs, however, the court concluded a reasonable 
finder of fact might have found that the INNOVATOR constituted a 
public forum and was, thus, beyond the control of University 
administrators.213 
Ultimately, although the student paper did not operate as a 
traditional public forum, the court concluded that the University 
had established the INNOVATOR as a designated or limited public 
forum.214 It was undisputed that the Student Communications 
Media Board dictated the terms on which the INNOVATOR 
operated.215 The Board was the ultimate publisher of the 
INNOVATOR and other subsidized student media.216 The Board 
determined how many publications it would underwrite, and its 
                                                          
209 Id. at 736. 
210 Id. at 737 (citing Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 
(1975)); see also, Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educator’s Ass’n, 460 U.S. 
37, 45 (1983). 
211 Id. at 737. 
212 Hosty, 412 F.3d at 737. 
213 Id. The court notes here, as well as earlier in its opinion that, when 
entertaining an interlocutory appeal by a public official seeking the privilege of 
qualified immunity, the threshold question is: “Taken in the light most favorable 
to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the [public official’s] 
conduct violated a constitutional right?” Id. at 733 (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 
U.S. 194, 201 (2001) (alterations in original)). 
214 Id. ([t]he court held that the INNOVATOR constituted a designated 
public forum, “where the editors were empowered to make their own decisions, 
wise or foolish, without fear that the administration would stop the presses.”). 
Id. at 738. 
215 Id. at 737. 
216 Id. 
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policy dictated that the staff of each funded publication would be 
free to determine content and format without censorship or 
advance approval.217 The University had declared the pages of the 
student newspaper open for expression and had thereby 
relinquished its right to engage in viewpoint or content 
discrimination.218 
Having established that Hazelwood’s applicability turned on a 
public forum analysis,219 the court next addressed Dean Carter’s 
claim of qualified immunity.220 Even assuming that both the 
district court and the Seventh Circuit panel were correct in their 
reasoning that student media in high schools and colleges operate 
under different constitutional frameworks, the court concluded that 
it “greatly overstates the certainty of the law” to say that any 
reasonable college administrator would have known that rule.221 
Relying on what it perceived as a split among the circuits, the 
Court of Appeals found that post-Hazelwood decisions had not 
“clearly established” that college administrators may not regulate 
student media.222 Citing Axson-Flynn v. Johnson223 and Bishop v. 
Arnov,224 the court concluded that at least two circuits had applied 
Hazelwood to the administrative actions at both the college and 
                                                          
217 Id. The court also noted that the funds for publications which the Board 
had conceded to underwrite were, as was the case in both Southworth and 
Rosenberger, derived entirely from student activity fees. For a discussion of 
Rosenberger, Southworth, and student speech subsidized by a mandatory student 
activity fee, see discussion supra Part IC. 
218 Hosty, 412 F.3d at 737. Judge Easterbrook explained that participants in 
a designated or limited public forum, such as the INNOVATOR, which was 
declared open to speech ex ante, “may not be censored ex post when the sponsor 
decides that particular speech is unwelcome.” Id. 




223 Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d 1277, 1289 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that “the 
Hazelwood framework is applicable in a university setting for speech that occurs 
in a classroom as part of a class curriculum.”). 
224 Bishop, 926 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that Hazelwood’s 
framework allows a university to order a professor to stop interjecting his 
personal religious views into classroom discussion.). 
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high school levels.225 The court relied on Student Government 
Association v. University of Massachusetts,226 and Kincaid v. 
Gibson227 to highlight the circuit split.228 Given this apparent 
confusion among the circuits regarding that applicability of 
Hazelwood to post-secondary education, and despite the fact that 
the INNOVATOR was operating as a limited public forum and thus 
exempt from university control, the court concluded that Dean 
Carter was entitled to qualified immunity.229 
C. Hosty v. Carter: The Dissent 
In a vigorous dissent, Judge Evans attacked the majority’s 
contention that there is no legal distinction between college and 
high school students.230 He noted that, in reality, “[t]he Court has 
long recognized that the status of minors under the law is unique in 
many respects.”231 Age, according to the Supreme Court, has 
always defined legal rights: 
Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being 
magically only when one attains the state-defined age of 
majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the 
Constitution and possess constitutional rights. The Court, 
indeed, however, long has recognized that the State has 
somewhat broader authority to regulate the activities of 
children than of adults.232 
                                                          
225 Hosty, 412 F.3d at 738. 
226 868 F.2d 743, 480 n.6 (1st Cir. 1989) (asserting, in reliance on 
Hazelwood’s footnote 7, that the Supreme Court has held that Hazelwood’s 
approach does not apply to post-secondary education.). 
227 236 F.3d 342, 345 n.5 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (holding that, in reliance 
on the parties’ agreement, Hazelwood has “little application” to collegiate 
publications.). 
228 Hosty, 412 F.3d at 738-39. The majority also cited Brown v. Li, 308 
F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2002), to illustrate the claim that many aspects of the law with 
respect to student speech are difficult to understand and apply. Id. at 739. 
229 Id. at 739. 
230 Id. (Evans, J., dissenting). 
231 Id. (quoting Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 633 (1979)). 
232 Id. at 740. (quoting Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 
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Citing Healy and its progeny, Evans noted that the Supreme 
Court has consistently drawn a bright line between high school and 
college students and that age has always defined the extent of a 
student’s right to freedom of speech.233 
According to the dissent, this distinction between high school 
students and college students who are, for all intents and purposes, 
“young adults,” 234 has been drawn because students in high school 
are less mature than their collegiate counterparts and the missions 
of secondary schools and institutions of higher learning are vastly 
different.235 Analysis of these differences render Hazelwood 
inapplicable outside of the high school context.236 
The dissent addressed the maturity distinction first, arguing 
that “[i]t is self-evident that, as a general matter, juveniles are less 
mature than adults.”237 It continued, “[a]t least in some precisely 
delineated areas, a child—like someone in a captive audience—is 
not possessed of that full capacity for individual choice which is 
the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees.”238 It was this 
reasoning that dictated the outcome in Hazelwood and Fraser.239 In 
Hazelwood, the Supreme Court stressed that, because in a high 
school setting the students are young, immature, and more 
                                                          
U.S. 52, 74 (1976)) (internal citations omitted). 
233 Id. For further discussion of Healy, Rosenberger and Southworth, see 
discussion supra Part IC. 





238 Id. (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649-650 (1968) 
(Stewart, J., concurring) (footnote omitted)); see also Tilton v. Richardson, 403 
U.S. 672, 686 (1981) (holding that as a general rule, college students are less 
impressionable than students in primary and secondary schools); Lee v. 
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992) (noting that “there are heightened concerns 
with protecting freedom of conscience from subtle coercive pressure in the 
elementary and secondary public schools.”); Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 635 (holding 
that “during the formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack 
the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that 
could be detrimental to them.”). 
239 Hosty, 412 F.3d at 740. 
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vulnerable to inappropriate influence, a more restrictive First 
Amendment standard was appropriate.240 Given the maturity level 
of the audience involved, it was reasonable for the school to 
restrict publication of articles concerning divorce, juvenile 
delinquency, and teen pregnancy.241 Similarly, in Fraser, where 
the Court permitted the school to sanction a lewd and suggestive 
speech given by a student at a school-sponsored assembly, the 
Court stressed that “[t]he speech could well be seriously damaging 
to its less mature audience.”242 The dissent in Hosty argued that 
these “same concerns simply do not apply to college students, who 
are certainly (as a general matter) more mature, independent 
thinkers.”243 
The dissent also compared the respective missions of high 
schools and those of colleges and universities and found the two 
were vastly different.244 Elementary and secondary schools have 
“custodial and tutelary responsibilities for children”245 and are, in 
large part, concerned with the “inculcation” of “values.”246 A 
university, on the other hand, represents the quintessential 
“marketplace of ideas”247—seeking to “facilitate a wide range of 
speech.”248 Citing Healy’s teaching that “[t]he precedents of [the 
                                                          
240 Id. (citing Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272). 
241 Id. 
242 Id. (citing Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683-84) (emphasis added). 
243 Id. at 741. 
244 Id. 
245 Id. (quoting Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 
822, 829-30 (2002)). 
246 Id. (citing Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683). 
247 Id. (citing Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 
589, 603 (1967)). 
248 Id. (citing Southworth, 529 U.S. at 231). For further support, the dissent 
cites to Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 836 (holding that permitting such censorship 
on college and university campuses “risks the suppression of free speech and 
creative inquiry in one of the vital centers for the Nation’s intellectual life.”); see 
also, Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (arguing that 
an atmosphere of “speculation, experiment and creation” is “essential to the 
quality of higher education.”) (internal citations omitted); Widmar, 454 U.S. at 
267-68 n. 5 (holding that “[t]he college classroom with its surrounding environs 
is peculiarly the marketplace of ideas.”). 
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Supreme Court] leave no room for the view that . . . First 
Amendment protections should apply with less force on college 
campuses than in the community at large,” the dissent in Hosty 
contended that it is inappropriate to extend Hazelwood to post-
secondary education.249 “This court,” it declared, “gives the green 
light to school administrators to restrict student speech in a manner 
inconsistent with the First Amendment.”250 
Finally, the dissent rejected the majority’s conclusion that 
Dean Carter was entitled to qualified immunity.251 Prior to 
Hazelwood, courts consistently held that university administrators 
could not require prior review of student media.252 Hazelwood, the 
dissent reasoned, did not change this rule. For purposes of 
qualified immunity, then, the question was whether any case 
following Hazelwood could have suggested to a reasonable person 
in Dean Carter’s position that she could prohibit publication of a 
student newspaper simply because she was opposed to its 
content.253 For the dissent, the answer was clearly “no.”254 In 
support of this conclusion, the dissent cited directly contradicting 
authority from Student Government Association and Kincaid.255 
The dissent also explicitly rejected the majority’s reliance on 
Bishop and Axson-Flynn, noting that both concerned free speech 
rights in the classroom.256 Furthermore, although the Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Axson-Flynn, acknowledged that 
some courts (namely the First and Sixth) had cast doubt on 
Hazelwood’s application to extracurricular curricular activities, it 
                                                          
249 Hosty, 412 F.3d at 741-42. For a more in-depth discussion of Healy and 
its progeny, see supra Part IC. 
250 Hosty, 412 F.3d. at 742. 
251 Id. 
252 Id. 
253 Id. at 743. 
254 Id. Whereas the majority picked up on Hazelwood’s footnote seven and 
asked whether post-Hazelwood decisions had “clearly established that college 
administrators must keep hands off all student newspapers,” the dissent framed 
the question differently. It asked whether decisions after Hazelwood said 
anything to suggest that college administrators could censor school newspapers. 
Id. at n. 3. 
255 Id. at 743. 
256 Hosty, 412 F.3d at 743. 
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explicitly stated that “because Axson-Flynn’s speech occurred as 
part of a curricular assignment during class time and in the 
classroom, [it would] not reach any analysis of university’s 
students’ extracurricular speech.”257 In sum, because it was 
“clearly established” that the University could not deny funding to 
the student paper simply because it found its contents offensive 
and, accordingly, the dissent concluded Dean Carter’s request for 
immunity should have been denied.258 
D. The Aftermath of the Seventh Circuit’s Pronouncement 
Reaction to the proceedings in Hosty has been extensive. Citing 
the effect that the ruling could have on student free speech rights, 
both the student and popular press have written extensively on the 
topic. Praising the now vacated Seventh Circuit panel’s decision, 
Mark Goodman, executive director of the Student Press Law 
Center, stated that it reaffirmed the last thirty years of college 
censorship cases.259 He hoped that this ruling would “dissuade—
once and for all—college officials who are inclined to censor from 
engaging in that unconstitutional behavior.”260 The Chicago 
Tribune reported that the student plaintiffs were “stunned and 
thrilled by the ruling.”261 Jim Killam, former president of the 
Illinois College Press Association called the panel’s decision “an 
overwhelming confirmation . . . that these students were right.”262 
Reaction continued following the Seventh Circuit’s en banc 
ruling. This time, however, the reaction was mainly hostile. 
“Beware the ruling that opens with a condescending joke,”263 
                                                          
257 Id. at 743-44 (quoting Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1286 n.6 (emphasis 
added) (internal citations omitted)). 
258 Id. at 744. 
259 SPLC Press Release, SPLC Praises Appellate Court Decision that 
Upholds College Press Rights, Apr. 10, 2003; available at http://www.splc. 
org/newsflash.asp?id=598. 
260 Id. 
261 Richard Wronski, Court Rips College for Censoring Paper; Appeals 
Panel Decides Against Governors State, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 11, 2003, at 6 (Metro). 
262 Id. 
263 Judge Easterbrook wrote, “[c]ontroversy began to swirl when Jeni 
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began one commentator, concluding that “Hazelwood is now 
inside the gates.”264 Mark Goodman noted that although student 
newspapers have traditionally been presumed to operate as public 
forums, the decision “gives schools the chance to argue that’s not 
what they intended.”265 Greg Lukianoff, Director of Legal and 
Public Advocacy for the Foundation for Individual Rights in 
Education (“FIRE”), opined that “[t]he summer of 2005 will be 
remembered as a rough season for student rights.”266 Margaret 
Hosty, the titular student plaintiff, called the decision “disastrous” 
and worried that it would not be limited to journalists, but might be 
extended to other areas of student expression.267 Some even went 
so far as to say that “[i]ndependent college journalism may soon be 
a relic of the past—on par with typewriters and eight-track cassette 
players—in at least three states, and potentially throughout the 
country.”268 
Although the majority of the commentary on the Hosty 
decision has been negative—even alarmist—others are not as 
concerned. The decision in Hosty was based, in large part, on the 
INNOVATOR’s status as a limited public forum. Scholars have 
surmised that “a vast majority of college newspapers would be 
found to be public forums,” and, as such, have concluded that 
Hosty might not have a “great negative impact.”269 A 
                                                          
Porche became editor in chief of the INNOVATOR, the student newspaper at 
Governors State University. None of the articles concerned the apostrophe 
missing from the University’s name. Instead the students tackled meatier fare.” 
Hosty, 412 F.3d at 732. 
264 “Hazelwood” Goes to College; Another Seventh Circuit Ruling, Another 
Defeat for the Press, CHICAGO READER, Vol. 34, Iss. 40. July 1, 2005. 
265 Student Media Experts React to Governors State University Ruling, 
supra note 163. 
266 Greg Lukianoff, Wronging Student Rights. BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 3, 
2005, OP-Ed, at A17. 
267 Rudolph Bush, College Paper Lawsuit Fails; Federal Court Backs 
Governors State Dean. CHI. TRIB., June 21, 2005, Metro, at 1. 
268 Harvey A. Silverglate, Assault on College Press; FIRST AMENDMENT. 
NAT’L L. J., Oct. 17, 2005, Vol.27, No.56, at 23. Mr. Silverglate’s reference to 
“at least three states” refers to the states within the jurisdiction of the Seventh 
Circuit – Wisconsin, Illinois and Indiana. 
269 See Student Media Experts React to Governors State University Ruling, 
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determination of forum status might be much more difficult of 
other student-funded expressive activities.270 So, while most 
student media enjoy a history of operating as a public forum, “[a] 
student group that brings speakers or shows films on campus may 
not have easily demonstrated that same tradition.”271 The real fear 
then, is not what will happen to student-run newspapers on college 
campuses, but how Hazelwood might be expanded to censor all 
forms of speech.272 
III. THE CASE AGAINST APPLYING HAZELWOOD TO INSTITUTIONS OF 
HIGHER LEARNING 
With the historical backdrop of First Amendment jurisprudence 
in mind, it becomes clear that the Seventh Circuit’s decision in 
Hosty was wrongly decided and that Hazelwood’s framework 
should not be applied to student speech on college and university 
campuses. In Hazelwood, the Court held that “educators do not 
offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over 
the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored 
expressive activities so long as their concerns are reasonably 
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”273 For a number of 
reasons, such a restrictive standard is inappropriate and ultimately 
unworkable at the collegiate level. 
A. Inherent Fundamental Differences Between High School 
and College Students 
The significant differences between high school students and 
their collegiate counterparts weigh heavily against applying 
Hazelwood outside of the confines of secondary education. First, 
high school students are almost exclusively minors, while college 
students are almost exclusively adults.274 The Supreme Court has 
                                                          
supra note 163. 
270 Id. 
271 Id. 
272 See discussion infra Part III. 
273 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988). 
274 According to the U.S. Census Bureau, only .9% of undergraduate 
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regularly highlighted the importance of this distinction. In Widmar 
v. Vincent,275 the Court held that “[u]niversity students are, of 
course, young adults. They are less impressionable than younger 
students.”276 Nine years earlier in Healy v. James, Justice Douglas 
wrote, “[s]tudents—who, by reason of the Twenty-Sixth 
Amendment, become eligible to vote when 18 years of age—are 
adults who are members of the college or university.”277 
Numerous lower courts have recognized the significance of this 
difference as well. For example, in upholding a high school’s 
prohibition of the distribution of an unofficial newspaper on its 
campus, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit cautioned that 
its decision only applied to “minors,” and not to university 
students, because “few college students are minors, and colleges 
are traditionally places of virtually unlimited free expression.”278 
In Bradshaw v. Rawlings, the Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit highlighted some of the many ways in which college 
students are treated as adults: 
College students today are no longer minors; they are 
now regarded as adults in almost every phase of 
community life. They may vote, marry, make a will, 
qualify as a personal representative, serve as a guardian of 
the estate of a minor, wager at racetracks, register as a 
public accountant, practice veterinary medicine, qualify as 
                                                          
students are below the age of 18. See 2003 U.S. Census Bureau Current 
Population Survey (CPS) Rep., Table E, College Enrollment by Selected 
Characteristics: October 2003. 
275 454 U.S. 263 (1981). 
276 Id. at 274 n. 14. 
277 Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 197 (1972); see also Bellotti v. Baird, 
443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979) (holding that “minors often lack the experience 
perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be 
detrimental to them.”); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 686 (1971) 
(upholding a federal law that provided funding to church-related colleges and 
universities for the construction of facilities to be used exclusively for secular 
educational purposes, the Court noted that while pre-college students may not 
have the maturity to make their own decisions concerning such weighty matters 
such as religion, “college students are less impressionable and less susceptible to 
religious indoctrination.”). See also discussion supra Part IC. 
278 Bystrom v. Fridley High Sch., 822 F.2d 747, 750 (8th Cir. 1987). 
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a practical nurse, drive trucks, ambulances and other 
official fire vehicles, perform general fire-fighting duties, 
and qualify as a private detective. [At age eighteen] 
criminal acts are no longer treated as those of a juvenile, 
and eighteen year old students may waive their testimonial 
privilege protecting confidential statements to school 
personnel.279 
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit, upholding a high school’s decision 
to prohibit advertisements for Planned Parenthood in its school 
publications, recognized that “educators must have the ability to 
consider the ‘emotional maturity of the intended audience.’”280 It 
was this very concern for the maturity level of the speaker and the 
intended audience that concerned the Supreme Court in both 
Fraser and Hazelwood. 
In Fraser, the Supreme Court’s central focus was the 
immaturity of the audience subject to Fraser’s sexually suggestive 
speech. The Court noted that, “The speech could well be seriously 
damaging to its less mature audience, many of whom were only 14 
years old and on the threshold of awareness of human 
sexuality.”281 Similar concerns were raised by the Court in 
Hazelwood: 
                                                          
279 612 F.2d 135, 139 (3d Cir. 1979) (internal footnotes omitted); see also, 
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 853 (1988) (noting that “[l]egislatures 
recognize the relative immaturity of adolescents, and we have often permitted 
them to define age-based classes that take account of this qualitative difference 
between juveniles and adults.”) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
280 Planned Parenthood of S. Nev., Inc. v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 941 
F.2d 817, 829 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272); see also 
Sypniewski v. Warren Reg’l Bd. of Educ., 307 F.3d 243, 267 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(holding that the public school setting is “fundamentally different” from the 
university setting because high school students are “minors.”); Beach v. Univ. of 
Utah, 726 P.2d 413, 418 (Utah 1986) (holding that “[we] do not believe that [a 
college student] should be viewed as fragile and in need of protection simply 
because she had the luxury of attending an institution of higher learning.”); 
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 429-30 (1992) (noting “the distinctive 
character of a university environment, or a secondary school environment, 
influences our First Amendment analysis.”) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
281 Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683-84 (1986) (internal 
citations omitted). 
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A school must be able to take into account the emotional 
maturity of the intended audience in determining whether 
to disseminate student speech on potentially sensitive 
topics, which might range from the existence of Santa 
Claus in an elementary school setting to the particulars of 
teenage sexual activity in a high school setting.282 
The Court’s heavy reliance on age and maturity level in 
deciding these cases make it clear that Hazelwood’s framework is 
inapplicable in a college setting. Seizing on this difference, the 
dissent in Hosty argued that the majority had failed to recognize 
this distinction.283 The dissent highlighted the fact that the students 
in Hazelwood were high school students while those in Hosty were 
in college, and that the Hazelwood Court itself had acknowledged 
the potential for different treatment of college students.284 Noting 
the emphasis the Supreme Court has consistently placed on the 
maturity level of the speaker and audience at issue, the dissent 
concluded that “[t]he same concerns simply do not apply to college 
students, who are certainly (as a general matter) more mature, 
independent thinkers.”285 This distinction, it argued, made it “clear 
that Hazelwood does not apply beyond high school contact.”286 
In other words, “the university campus should be considered to 
society at large.”287 College students are afforded far more rights 
than their high school counterparts,288 and the typical college 
experience is devoid of most of the traditional features of pre-
college life.289 Moreover, because attendance is not compulsory, 
                                                          
282 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272 (1988). 
283 Hosty, 412 F.3d at 739 (Evans, J., dissenting) (“The majority’s 
conclusion flows from an incorrect premisethat there is no legal distinction 
between college and high school students.”). 
284 Id. at 739-40. 
285 Id. at 741. 
286 Id. at 740. 
287 Greg C. Tenhoff, Censoring the Public University Student Press: A 
Constitutional Challenge, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 511, 535 (1991). 
288 Id. (“American society bestows upon new adults full legal rights and 
responsibilities; with these rights and responsibilities, unfortunately, comes 
exposure to the unpleasant elements of society.”). 
289 See Fiore, supra note 103, at 1957. 
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college and university students should not be considered a “captive 
audience.”290 As one commentator put it, “[i]n the university 
context, the focus is not on children in the public schools who need 
to be sheltered from harms inherent in the community at large . . . . 
At some point, society needs to send its young adults to face the 
world, with all its unpleasantries and hazards.”291 
B. The Respective Missions of High Schools and Universities 
In a similar vein, the respective missions of universities and 
high schools are entirely different. In Fraser, the Supreme Court 
recognized that primary and secondary schools “must inculcate the 
habits and manners of civility as values in themselves conducive to 
happiness and as indispensable to the practice of self-government 
in the community and the nation.”292 By contrast, the Supreme 
Court, in Healy, recognized that “the college classroom with its 
surrounding environs is peculiarly the “‘marketplace of ideas.’”293 
As one commentator concluded, “While inculcating values in 
children is arguably necessary to an orderly society, such a purpose 
                                                          
290 Tenhoff, supra note 287 (“university students are not a captive audience 
as are high school students.”). 
291 Id. See also Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 876 (1982) (Blackmun, 
J., concurring in part); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979) (holding 
“[t]oday, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local 
governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for 
education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to 
our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic 
public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation 
of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to 
cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping 
him to adjust normally to his environment.”) (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 
347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)). 
292 Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) (internal citations 
omitted). 
293 Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972); see also Keyishian v. Bd. of 
Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (holding that “[t]he 
classroom is peculiarly the “marketplace of ideas.” The Nation’s future depends 
upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas 
which discovers truth “out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any 
kind of authoritative selection.”) (internal citations omitted). 
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has no place in the world of adults. Adults must be considered to 
have the ability to shape their own values outside the realm of 
institutional coercion.”294 
Hosty involved students on a university campus. In fact, more 
than a typical college or university, Governors State defines itself 
as “An upper-division university: [offering] undergraduate courses 
at the junior and senior level leading to completion of a 
baccalaureate degree and graduate level courses leading to a 
master’s degree.”295 The average age of the students at GSU is 33 
and 71% of the student body are women, many of whom are single 
working mothers.296 Certainly these students, many of them 
parents themselves, should not be subject to the same restrictive 
Hazelwood standard applicable to their younger, high school 
counterparts. Extending Hazelwood in such circumstances opens 
the door for censorship of student speech not only at the 
undergraduate level, but at the post-graduate level as well. Taken 
to this extreme, even students studying for a masters degree in 
journalism might be subject to administrative censorship. 
Commenting on this absurdity, one scholar noted, “[with the ruling 
in Hosty] we’re going to have students learning journalism for 
eight years under conditions that bear no resemblance to real 
conditions.”297 
Moreover, GSU states as one of its missions (a statement that is 
typical of most colleges and universities),298 “To cultivate and 
enlarge a diverse and intellectually stimulating community of 
learners guided by a culture that embodies: Openness of 
                                                          
294 Tenhoff, supra note 287, at 530. 
295 Governors State University website, Facts and Figures, http://www. 
govst.edu/aboutgsu/t_aboutgsu.asp?id=204. 
296 Id. 
297 Irwin Gratz, president of the Society of Professional Journalists, in the 
Student Press Law Center Fall 2005 Report, at 24; available at 
http://www.splc.org/report_detail.asp?id=1239&edition=37. 
298 The Foundation for Individual Rights in Education (“FIRE”), a non-
profit organization dedicated to the protection of free speech rights on campuses 
across the country, provides a service on its website that allows visitors to search 
for any college or university in the nation. Once a school is selected, FIRE’s 
website provides links to relevant school policies such as sexual harassment 
policies, speech codes, and mission statements. See http://www.thefire.org. 
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communication; diversity of backgrounds, experiences, and 
perspectives; mutual respect and cooperation; critical inquiry, 
constant questioning, and continuing assessment.”299 Given this, 
censoring student speech, simply because it offends the 
administration, is not only an unconstitutional violation of the First 
Amendment, but also runs afoul not only of the stated mission of 
the school but also the well-established view of the nation’s 
universities as the quintessential marketplace of ideas. 
C. Application of a Public Forum Analysis 
Application of the public forum doctrine in the context of 
college student publications is improper.300 Forum analysis 
presumes that simply by virtue of proximity to or financial control 
over the expressive venue, the government may lawfully control 
otherwise constitutionally protected speech. In Hazelwood, the 
Supreme Court applied a public forum analysis, concluding that 
because the student newspaper in question was a non-public forum, 
school officials were within their rights to control its content.301 
Traditional public forum analysis, while logical when applied to a 
high school setting, is simply unworkable at the university level. 
Rarely have courts relied on public forum analysis in order to 
determine the level of First Amendment protections to which 
collegiate student speech is entitled.302 Instead, although most 
court decisions suggest some type of forum analysis, it is apparent 
that courts have simply assumed that as editors of a student 
publication, college-aged students are given the authority to 
determine the content of the medium.303 
                                                          
299 Governors State University website, Mission Statement, 
http://www.govst.edu/sas/t_hb.asp?id=2933. 
300 For a more detailed discussion of the public forum doctrine, see supra 
note 72. 
301 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 269-70 (1988). In 
making its determination, the Court considered several factors. For a more 
detailed discussion of the Court’s considerations, see discussion supra Part IA3. 
302 Student Press Law Center, Law of the Student Press 53 (2nd ed. 1994). 
303 Id.; see also, Joyner v. Whiting, 477 F.2d 456, 460 (4th Cir. 1973) 
(holding “[b]ut if a college has a student newspaper, its publication cannot be 
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Most courts have suggested that to deem a college student 
publication a non-public forum would be illogical.304 Based on a 
heavy presumption in favor of protection for the college student 
press, courts have upheld students’ rights to publish a wide variety 
of potentially controversial material.305 A majority of courts insist 
that unless school administrators are able to demonstrate that 
publication of the material in question would satisfy Tinker’s 
substantial disruption requirement, censorship of the expression is 
prohibited by the First Amendment.306 
Where the issue has been addressed, courts have uniformly—
until Hosty—declined to extend Hazelwood’s framework to college 
student publications. To date, two Circuits have explicitly refused 
to do so. In Student Government Association v. Board of Trustees 
                                                          
suppressed because college officials dislike its editorial content.”); Stanley v. 
McGrath, 719 F.2d 279, 282 (8th Cir. 1983) (holding, “[a] public university may 
not constitutionally take adverse action against a student newspaper, such as 
withdrawing or reducing the paper’s funding, because it disapproves of the 
content of the paper.”); Schiff v. Williams, 519 F.2d 257, 260 (5th Cir. 1975) 
(noting that “the right of free speech embodied in the publication of a college 
student newspaper cannot be controlled except under special circumstances.”). 
304 Id.; see e.g., Antonelli v. Hammond, 308 F. Supp. 1329, 1336 (D. Mass. 
1970) (holding “[t]he university setting of college-age students being exposed to 
a wide range of intellectual experience creates a relatively mature marketplace 
for the interchange of ideas, so the underlying assumption that there is a positive 
social value in an open forum seems particularly appropriate.”); Bazaar v. 
Fortune, 476 F.2d 570, 574 (5th Cir. 1973) (holding “[i]t seems a well 
established rule that once a university recognizes a student activity that has 
elements of free expression, it can act to censor that expression only if it acts 
consistent with First Amendment constitutional guarantees.”). 
305 For examples of such publications, see e.g., Thonen v. Jenkins, 491 F.2d 
722 (4th Cir. 1973) (concerning a letter published in the student newspaper 
ending with a “four-letter vulgarity” referring to the college president); Korn v. 
Elkins, 317 F. Supp. 138 (D. Md. 1970) (allowing publication of a student 
feature magazine featuring a burning American flag on the cover); Dickey v. 
Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 273 F. Supp. 613 (M.D. Ala. 1967) (permitting 
student publication of criticisms of the Governor of the State of Alabama and 
the State Legislature); Panarella v. Birenbaum, 32 N.Y.2d 108 (N.Y. 1973) 
(allowing publication of several articles (that the court itself termed “derogatory, 
profane, and blasphemous”) in a student-run college newspaper.). 
306 See, e.g., Korn, 317 F. Supp. at 142; Mazart, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 118; 
Antonelli, 308 F. Supp. at 1336. 
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of the University of Massachusetts,307 the Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit held that a university’s decision to close its student 
legal services office did not violate the First Amendment, even if 
the decision was prompted by lawsuits the office had filed against 
the school on the students’ behalf.308 In doing so, the court 
distinguished student newspapers, which operate as open or limited 
public forums and are consequently granted broad First 
Amendment protections, from the legal services office which did 
not operate as a public forum.309 In a footnote, the court stated, 
“Hazelwood . . . is not applicable to college newspapers.”310 More 
recently, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit addressed the 
issue in Kincaid v. Gibson.311 Applying a public forum analysis, 
the court determined that the Thorobread, the student yearbook at 
Kentucky State University, should be classified as a limited public 
forum.312 Because the yearbook did not fall into the non-public 
forum category, the court determined that “Hazelwood [had] little 
application to [the] case.”313 
Ultimately, public forum analysis where college student 
publications are concerned simply does not fit. To begin, in 
determining that the Spectrum was a non-public forum, the 
Supreme Court in Hazelwood emphasized the fact that the paper 
was controlled by the school through financial assistance and 
editorial oversight.314 Such is not the case with collegiate student 
publications. The vast majority of newspapers at public colleges 
and universities are largely or completely financially independent 
of the school, and almost all exist apart from the school’s 
curriculum and are editorially autonomous.315 Moreover, the 
                                                          
307 868 F.2d 473 (1st Cir. 1989). 
308 Id. at 477. 
309 Id. at 480 (“the [Legal Services Office] is not a channel of 
communication and forum analysis is therefore inapplicable.”). 
310 Id. at 480 n.6. 
311 236 F.3d 342 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc). 
312 Id. at 346 n.5. 
313 Id. 
314 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kulhmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 262-63 (1988). 
315 Brief Amici Curiae of the Student Press Law Center, in Support of 
Plaintiffs-Appellees Margaret Hosty, et. al., (No. 01-4155), reprinted in SPLC, 
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Hazelwood Court stressed the fact that the high school newspaper 
was part of the curriculum.316 Again, such is not typical of student 
publications in a post-secondary setting. In fact, “a 1997 study 
found that only one of the 101 daily college student newspapers 
surveyed could be classified as strongly curriculum based.”317 
Central to Hazelwood’s public forum analysis were several 
factors. In Lueth v. St. Clair County Community College,318 a 
federal district court considered these factors in determining 
whether The Gazette, a student-run college newspaper, should be 
considered a public forum. Comparing the operation of the student 
paper at issue in Hazelwood and that of the Gazette, the court 
found significant differences between the two: 
First, the Gazette does not operate in a “laboratory 
situation,” in that the Gazette is not operated under the 
guise of a specific academic course, and exists under 
formal school policy as a student administered activity and 
not within the defendant community college’s “adopted 
curriculum.” Second, the Gazette is not created under the 
direction of a faculty member, but is instead operated 
entirely by student participants, particularly the Editor-in-
Chief. In fact, the Editor-in-Chief, per express terms of the 
Rules and Regulations of the Gazette, fulfills most of the 
                                                          
Brief of the Student Press Law Center and 24 other media, First Amendment, 
and journalism education organizations (visited Nov. 30, 2005), available at 
http://www.splc.org/pdf/gsuamicus.pdf (hereinafter SPLC Hosty Brief) (citing 
Lillian Lodge Kopenhaver, CAMPUS MEDIA OPERATIONS, College Media 
Review (Winter 2002), at 6. (noting that a 2001 survey found that more than 
70% of newspapers at public four-year institutions received more than half of 
their funding and revenue from advertising. The study also found that almost 
one-fifth of all college student newspapers generate 90% or more of their own 
funds through advertising.)); see also Tenhoff, supra note 287, at 514 (noting 
that the vast majority of a university newspaper’s funding comes from its own 
advertising and citing the fact that, in some instances, newspapers only receive 
university funding when their advertising income is insufficient). 
316 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 268. 
317 SPLC Hosty Brief, supra note 315 (citing John Bodle, The Instructional 
Independence of Daily Student Newspapers, JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. 
EDUCATOR, Winter 1997, at 16). 
318 732 F. Supp. 1410 (E.D. Mich. 1990). 
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obligations attributed to the [Hazelwood] teacher. Finally, 
the Gazette is freely distributed throughout the local 
community, and seeks outside advertisers to aid in the 
funding of the paper’s publication.319 
Given these differences, the unique nature of college student media 
should not be subject to a strict and unyielding public forum 
analysis. Rather, as the Supreme Court has indicated,320 courts 
presented with First Amendment free speech and press challenges 
should engage in a careful review of the nature and context of the 
student speech in question. 
Despite its inappropriateness and impropriety, application of a 
public forum analysis in Hosty reveals the INNOVATOR as a 
designated or limited public forum. Though the Seventh Circuit 
ultimately reached this conclusion, it did so grudgingly.321 The 
INNOVATOR was financially independent, funded entirely from 
the Student Activities Fees.322 Moreover, although there was a 
faculty advisor in place, the students were editorially 
autonomous—charged with determining the format and content of 
the paper—and were not, according to school policy, subject to 
                                                          
319 Id. at 1414-15. 
320 See, e.g., Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes, 523 
U.S. 666, 672-73 (1998) (holding that “the public forum doctrine should not be 
extended in a mechanical way to the very different context of public television 
broadcasting.”); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense Fund and Educational 
Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985) (stating that the Court will not ignore the 
special nature and function of the federal workplace in evaluating the limits that 
may be imposed on an organization’s right to participate in a fundraising 
forum.); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 44 
(1983) (holding that “[t]he existence of a right of access to public property and 
the standard by which limitations upon such a right must be evaluated differ 
depending on the character of the property at issue.”). 
321 Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731, 737 (7th Cir. 2005). Easterbrook, writing 
for the majority, noted, “[w]e do not think it possible on this record to determine 
what kind of forum the University established . . . [But the question is] whether 
the evidence makes out a constitutional claim when taken in a light most 
favorable to the plaintiff.” Id. Accordingly, the majority conceded that the 
record would permit a reasonable fact finder to conclude that INNOVATOR 
operated in a public forum. 
322 Id. at 738. 
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prior review.323 The INNOVATOR, operating as a limited public 
forum, was beyond the purview of the University, and Dean 
Carter’s demand for prior review and approval amounted to a 
violation of the students’ First Amendment rights. 
D. Potential Chilling—The Practical Effect of Hosty 
By questioning the traditional presumption of independence of 
college student media, the Hosty court introduced a dangerous 
ambiguity to the rights of all students engaged in any form of 
expression. As Mark Goodman, executive director of the Student 
Press Law Center noted, “Traditionally, student newspapers were 
presumed by their very nature to be forums for free expression . . . 
[Hosty] gives schools the chance to argue that’s not what they 
intended.”324 Goodman went on to suggest that determining forum 
status for other school-funded student activities, such as speakers 
and films, might be even more difficult since those forms of 
expression do not enjoy the traditional presumption of operating as 
a public forum.325 For example, in November 2004, Indian River 
Community College (FL) refused to allow the film The Passion of 
the Christ on campus. The College claimed an unwritten blanket 
ban on R-rated movies, despite the fact that at around the same 
time, the school had allowed theatrical productions that would 
have garnered an R rating and had sponsored at least one other R-
rated film.326 
Writing for the majority in Hosty, Judge Easterbrook noted, 
“Let us not forget that academic freedom includes the authority of 
the university to manage an academic community and evaluate 
teaching and scholarship free from interference.”327 Clearly 
suggesting that determining the content of a school-funded 
newspaper might be a proper exercise of the university’s academic 
                                                          
323 Id. at 737-38. 
324 Student Media Experts React to Governors State University Ruling, 
supra note 163. 
325 Id. 
326 More information about this case is available on FIRE’s website at 
http://www.thefire.org/index.php/case/661.html. 
327 Hosty, 412 F.3d at 736. 
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freedom, the Hosty majority ignored the possibility that an 
extension of Hazelwood’s framework to the post-secondary level 
might also chill faculty members’ exercise of First Amendment 
rights. Hazelwood has been interpreted by numerous lower courts 
to apply to both student and teacher speech.328 Courts have granted 
high school administrators broad329 and, in at least one case, 
apparently unlimited330 authority to dictate curriculum and 
presentation of material in the classroom. At least one court, 
recognizing the potentially devastating implications of extending 
Hazelwood to faculty speech, explicitly refused to reach the 
                                                          
328 See, e.g., Richard J. Peltz, Censorship Tsunami Spares College Media: 
To Protect Free Expression on Public Campuses, Lessons From the “College 
Hazelwood” Case, 68 TENN. L. REV. 481, 483 (2001) (reasoning that 
“Hazelwood has served as a springboard for lower courts to allow executive 
inroads not only into other student constitutional freedoms, but also into the 
sacrosanct realm of teachers’ academic freedom.”). 
329 See, e.g., Webster v. New Lenox Sch. Dist. No. 122, 917 F.2d 1004 (7th 
Cir. 1990) (rejecting a high school teacher’s claim that he should be permitted to 
teach a non-evolutionary theory in his social studies class.); Ward v. Hickey, 
996 F.2d 448, 453 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding “[l]ike the newspaper, a teacher’s 
classroom speech is part of the curriculum. Indeed, a teacher’s principal 
classroom role is to teach students the school curriculum. Thus, schools may 
reasonably limit teachers’ speech in that setting.”); Kirkland v. Northside Indep. 
Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794, 800 (5th Cir. 1998) (“Although the concept of 
academic freedom has been recognized in our jurisprudence, the doctrine has 
never conferred upon teachers the control of public school curricula.”); Miles v. 
Denver Public Schools, 944 F.2d 773, 779 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding “case law 
does not support [a] position that a secondary school teacher has a constitutional 
right to academic freedom.”); Silano v. Sag Harbor Union Free Sch. Dist. Bd. of 
Ed., 42 F.3d 719, 722 (2nd Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1160 (1995) 
(explaining that school officials are in the best position to ensure that their 
students “learn whatever lessons [an] activity is designed to teach, [and] that 
readers or listeners are not exposed to material that may be inappropriate for 
their level of maturity.”) (internal citations omitted). 
330 Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. of Ed., 136 F.3d 364 (4th Cir. 1998) 
(en banc). Here, the court rejected a high school drama teacher’s claim that her 
transfer to junior high was in retaliation for her selection of a controversial play. 
In dicta the court found that regulation of the curriculum is, by definition, a 
legitimate pedagogical concern, and that the teacher had no First Amendment 
right to control its makeup. Id. at 370. 
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issue.331 Such an expansion of Hazelwood’s restrictive framework 
would effectively defeat the notion of the university as a 
“quintessential marketplace of ideas” and provide public school 
administrators with unprecedented authority to control faulty 
speech. 
Finally, endorsement of Hazelwood beyond the high school 
setting will have a potentially destructive effect on the recruitment 
and training of future professional journalists. Research 
demonstrates that early participation on student newspapers is 
profoundly influential on student journalists’ attitudes toward the 
press.332 Not only is an uncensored college newspaper vital to 
attracting new journalism students, it provides those students with 
real-world training. Both large and small newspapers look highly 
favorably upon prior journalism experience and well-honed writing 
skills when hiring new reporters.333 Moreover, apart from writing 
and reporting skills, by working for a college newspaper, aspiring 
journalists learn to accept responsibility for what they publish. For 
this reason, it is argued that “the student publication offers the 
single best avenue for training—superior even to the journalism 
school . . . for a career in professional journalism.”334 Extending 
Hazelwood to allow administrative control over these publications 
would defeat these goals. As Professor Peltz observed, “Imagine a 
generation of college-trained journalists with no practical 
experience handling controversial subject matter, nor with any 
more than an academic understanding of the role of the Fourth 
                                                          
331 Vanderhurst v. Colorado Mountain College Dist., 208 F.3d 908 (10th 
Cir. 2000) (holding “we need not decide definitively, however, whether that 
framework does in fact govern a public college or university’s control over the 
classroom speech of a professor or other instructor.”). 
332 See generally, Michael McDevitt et al., The Making and Unmaking of 
Civic Journalists: Influences of Professional Socialization, 79 JOURNALISM & 
MASS COMMC’N Q. 87 (2002); Jennifer Rauch, et al., Clinging to Tradition, 
Welcoming Civic Solutions: A Survey of College Students’ Attitude Toward 
Civic Journalism, 58 JOURNALISM & MASS COMMC’N EDUCATOR 175 (2003). 
333 Barbara J. Hipsman & Stanley T. Wearden, SKILLS TESTING AT 
AMERICAN NEWSPAPERS, at 11-14 (Aug. 1989) (paper presented for Education 
in Journalism and Mass Communication, Newspaper Division). 
334 Peltz, supra note 328, at 482. 
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Estate in American society.”335 
CONCLUSION 
On February 21, 2006, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in 
the matter of Hosty v. Carter, allowing the Seventh Circuit’s ruling 
to stand. There is, on one hand, an argument to be made for 
upholding the decision. In Hazelwood’s infamous footnote seven, 
the Supreme Court acknowledged the possibility of extending its 
holding to post-secondary education: “We need not now decide 
whether the same degree of deference is appropriate with respect to 
school-sponsored expressive activities at the college and university 
level.”336 If the Court had meant to confine Hazelwood to the high 
school setting, the note would be superfluous. Instead, its presence 
suggests that future courts, acting in much the same way as the 
Seventh Circuit, might be justified in extending the ruling to 
college student speech. 
There are, however, stronger arguments in favor of limiting 
Hazelwood to the high school setting. Critical comparison of Hosty 
and Hazelwood reveals that the biggest similarity between the two 
is that they both involved a student newspaper. The similarities end 
there. As discussed in Part III, the differences between primary and 
secondary school students and their college counterparts are both 
numerous and profound. In order to justify its decision in Hosty 
and apply Hazelwood to speech on college campuses, the Seventh 
Circuit effectively had to overrule more than thirty years of First 
Amendment jurisprudence. First, the Seventh Circuit failed to 
address adequately the fundamental differences that exist between 
high school and college students. Further, the court cannot 
reconcile the profoundly different approaches that have been taken 
toward free speech in primary and secondary schools as compared 
to undergraduate and graduate institutions. Finally, any court 
wishing to extend Hazelwood would have to consider the 
inevitable chilling effect, not only on student journalists, but on all 
speech on the nation’s university campuses. Allowing 
                                                          
335 Id. 
336 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 n.7 (1988). 
NIMICK MACROED CORRECTED 07-30-6.DOC 7/30/2006 12:36 PM 
 FREE SPEECH ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES 997 
Hazelwood’s restrictive framework inside the college gates is to 
substantially disrupt the well-established ideal of the university as 
the “quintessential marketplace of ideas.” 
 
